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THE CASH SELLER UNDER




Although there is abundant. commentary on the rights of the credit seller
under section 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code,' particularly the
credit seller's rights in bankruptcy, there is a dearth of commentary on the
rights of the cash seller under the Code. 2 Yet, cases involving the cash sell-
er's rights under the Code raise as many issues as those involving the credit
seller's rights. Consequently, a comprehensive examination of the cash seller's
rights is long overdue.
In this article, we will address the cash seller's rights under the Code,
contending that these rights should be greater than they are under some of
the prevailing case law. We first will examine the cash seller's rights at com-
mon law. Then we will focus on the drafting and legislative history of sections
2-507(2), 2-511(3), and 2-403, which govern the cash seller's rights under the
Code. Next., we will examine in detail the seller's rights against both buyer
and third parties—good faith purchasers for value, lien creditors, and Article
9 secured parties. Finally, we will discuss the many unresolved questions pre-
sented by the interaction of the principal cash sale provisions, sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3), with various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
I. THE CASH SELLER UNDER THE COMMON LAW
The common law defined the cash sale or, as it was often called, the
"technical cash sale," as a sale in which title to the goods sold passed from
Copyright © 1979 Boston College Law School.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business Administration,
University of North Carolina.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University.
' See Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Act: A Roadmap
of the Strategies, 18 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 609, 609 n.3 (1977), fOr a partial listing of
commentary on this question. See also Weintraub & Edelman, Seller's Right to Reclaim
Property Under Section 2-702(2) of the Code Under the Bankruptcy Act; Fact or Fancy, 32
Bus. LAw. 1165 (1977); Schell, The Seller's Right to Reclaim: Another Conflict Between the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act?, 52 NOTRE DAME LAw. 219 (1976).
According to our research, only the following articles discuss the cash sell-
er's rights: Dugan, Cash Sale Sellers Under Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
8 U.C.C. L. J. 330 (1976); Mann & Phillips, supra note 1, at 642-47; McDonnel, The
Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 429 (1977); Wiseman, Cash
Sellers, Secured Finances and the Meat Industry An Analysis of Articles Two and Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 19 B.C. L. REv. 101 (1977); 48 U. Cow. L. REV. 267 (1977);
77 CoLum. L. REV. 934 (1977); 25 DRAKE L. REV. 239 (1975); 0 CREicarroN L. REV.
412 (1975); 7 ST. MARy's L.J. 462 (1975). The student articles relate primarily to In re
Samuels & Co., 526 F.2c1 1238 (511, Cir. 1976). There is a fair amount of commentary
on the cash seller's right at common Law. We have used much of this commentary in
the first section of our article,
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seller to buyer only upon the buyer's payment of the purchase price. 3 Al-
though some commentators defined the cash sale as involving the transfer of
both title and possession upon payment of the price, 4
 most courts defined it
as involving the transfer of possession in expectation of immediate payment;
these courts contemplated substantially simultaneous delivery and payment. 5
Thus, in a cash sale at common law, "the seller delivers possession to the
buyer in the understanding that the price shall be paid at once and title shall
not pass until payment."" A conditional sale, on the other hand, was defined
as a sale in which the seller transferred possession to the buyer while ex-
pressly retaining title until he received full payment.' While this definition of
a conditional sale obviously overlapped with the definition of a cash sale,"
there were differences between the two transactions. In most conditional sales,
the seller did not transfer possession with an expectation of immediate pay-
ment, but, rather, extended possession of the goods and employed a security
device to retain title (and the consequent right to reclaim the goods if the
buyer defaulted) until the buyer completed a series of installment payments. 9
Both the cash sale and the conditional sale were distinguishable from the
credit sale in which the seller transferred possession and title to the buyer in
expectation of future payment."
Whether the transaction was a cash or credit sale depended upon when
title to the goods passed which, in turn, depended upon the parties' intent."
However, since parties did not always manifest their intent," courts had to
resort to presumptions about the passage of title. In some early decisions, the
courts assumed that unless there was a provision for credit, title did not pass
until the purchase price was paid; these courts assumed "that sales in which
no time is agreed upon for payment are prima facie cash sales." 13 In twen-
tieth century cases, however, the courts usually assumed that title passed upon
formation of the sales contract unless a contrary intent appeared."
L. Vow, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 168 (1931).
I See, e.g., 2 WILLISTON ON SALES § 341, at 325 (rev. ed. 1948); Note, The
"Cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and Policy Anomaly, 62 YALE L.J.
101, 102 n.6 (1952).
Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and Conflicting
Analogies, 1 HANTINGs J. 11 I , 111-12 (1950). This is an obvious concession to the ex-
treme difficulty, not to say physical impossibility, of an exactly simultaneous exchange
of possession and payment in the typical sale for cash. See also Voi.o, supra note 3, at
170-71.
" J. WAreE, THE LAW OF SALES 78 (2d ed. 1938).
7 See WiLusToN, supra note 4, § 341, at 325; WAITE, supra note 6, at 279-80.
a For the employment of a "conditional sale" rationale to what are arguably
"cash sale" situations, see the cases discussed in Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and
the Bona Err& Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. REV. 55, 66-67 (1956); 62 YALE Lj., supra note 4,
at 108-09. For a further discussion of this overlap, see WAITE, supra note 6, at 279-80.
See Vow, supra note 3, at 267-68; Corman, supra note 8, at 66; WI ws-roN,
supra note 4, § 341. at 325.
'" See Wii.usToN„supra note 4, § 343, at 330, 335.
'' See 62 YALE Li., supra note 4, at 101. See also UNIFORM SALES Ace, § 18(1).
12
 See Corman, supra note 8, at 60, especially note 36.
1 " Vow„rupra note 3, at 176.
14 14 SUPra note 4, § 343, at 330. See also BURDICK ON SALES 58, 60 (3(f
ed. 1913); Vow, supra note 3, at 167-68, 176. Section 19, Rule 1, of the Uniform Sales
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After the development of this presumption in favor of credit sales, the
classification of a sale as one for cash frequently turned upon whether the
requisite "contrary intention" was present." Where the sales agreement ex-
pressly stipulated that title passed only when the price was paid, the transac-
tion usually was considered a cash sale.'" Two other situations almost univer-
sally regarded as cash sales were "over-the-counter" and self-service store
sales."' By far the most important "cash sale" situation occurred where the
agreement. otherwise contemplated a cash sale and the seller parted with pos-
session and accepted the buyer's worthless check as payment.'" On the other
hand, auction sales involving any sort of a credit provision 2" and "cash on
delivery" sales 21 usually were not regarded as "cash" sales.
This characterization of a sale as either a cash, conditional, or credit sale
was important because this characterization affected the seller's ability to re-
cover the goods in the event the buyer failed to pay. If a sale was classified as
a cash sale the seller retained title to the items transferred and could reclaim
any goods for which the buyer did not pay.'" The seller could waive his right
Act exemplified the modern rule: "Where there is an unconditional contract to sell
specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer
when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or the
time of delivery, or both, be postponed." The Uniform Sales Act, however, did not
contain an express "cash sale" provision. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1060 n.10 (1954).
When title passes upon formation of the sales contract, the seller retains a
"seller's lien" for the price as long as he retains possession of the goods. VOLD, supra
note 3, at 168. For more information on sellers' liens, sec id. at 224-25.
'' It is interesting to note that although contract language such as "terms cash"
or "cash sale" seems to express clearly a contrary intent, the courts did not always so
find. See V oil), supra note 3, at 171-72; WAITE, supra note 6, at 280; WILLISTON, supra
note 4, § 343, at 335.
VoLe, supra note 3, at 169. In such a case, however, the "cash sale" began to
take on some of the attributes of a conditional sale. See W ArrE, supra note 6, at 280
(where "the intent to hold up title until payment is inferable, rather than expressed,
the transaction is apt to be called a 'cash sale,' rather than a 'conditional sale.'''). This
article, however, takes a broader view of the cash sale. See, e.g., 62 YALE Lj., supra
note 4, at 107-08 (especially the text accompanying note 45).
17 Vow, supra note 3, at 169; WiLusToN, supra note 4, § 343, at. 333.
18 WILLISTON, .supra note 4, § 343, at 333-34; 13 OKLA. L. REv. 350, 352-53
(1960).
111 Vow, supra note 3, at 174; K. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
SALES 501 (1970). Williston severely criticized the characterization of "bad check" sales
as cash sales; Vold staunchly defended this characterization. Compare WiLusToN, supra
note 4, § 346a, with Vold, supra note 5. Williston eventually admitted t hat "so far as the
cases on worthless checks are involved the author's [Williston's] analysis is not sup-
ported by the weight of authority." WILLISTON, ,supra note 4, § 346b, at 346. For an
article supportive of Williston, see Note, The Effect of Accepting a Worthless Check Where
the Parties Contemplate a Cash Sale, 28 Ky. L.J. 322 (1940).
2 " VOID, supra note 3, at 170.
21 BURDICK, supra note 14, at 62-63; WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 345; 16 Micti.
L. REv. 557 (1918).
Y2 xlv OLD, supra note 3, at 172; WAITE, supra note 6, at 79; NORDSTROM, supra
note 19, at 501 n.96. Where there was no cash sale and title had passed, the seller had
an action for the price. WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 343, at 337. He might also have had
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to reclaim, however.• Waiver frequently occurred because the seller failed to
object to nonpayment or failed to attempt reclamation within a reasonable
time." Waiver also occurred where the seller delayed presentment. of a
buyer's check or transferred an "indicia of ownership," such as a negotiable
bill of lading or a warehouse receipt, with the goods.24
In other situations at, common law, a seller lost his right of reclamation
because third parties were involved in the transaction. 25 Whether the seller
lost his right depended on the identity of the third party. Where a good faith
purchaser for value bought the seller's goods from the buyer, courts were
divided over which party prevailed, although twentieth century courts gener-
ally held that the seller lost his right to reclaim.'" In contrast, the cash seller
retained his right. to reclaim where a lien creditor of the buyer attached the
an action on the instrument in a -bad check" case. See NoRosattom, supra note 1 9 , at
502 (discussing the "had check" situation under the LiCC).
23
 The case most often cited in this regard was Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67
A. 45 (1907) (2 1/2 month delay). See Note, Right to Reclaim Delivered Goody in a Cash
Sale, 36 DICK. L. Rev. 276 (1932).
24 See Corman, supra note 8, at 65-66: 62 YALE L.J., supra note 4, at 109-10.
Sometimes a finding of waiver was based on the doctrine of ladies. id.
25 Some authorities suggested that different rules should apply to situations
involving third parties if the buyer fraudulently induced the seller to agree to a cash
sale. See WIWSTON, supra note 4, 346a, at 344-45; Note, 28 Ky. L.J., supra note 19,
at 327; 17 TENN. L. Rev. 272 (1942). These commentators presumed that the defraud-
ing buyer took "voidable title." As a result, the cash seller lost to good faith purchasers
in almost all cases, to lien creditors in a few states, and to secured parties in some
cases. See text and notes 26-33 infra. The anomalous result of this position was that the
defrauded cash seller had less chance of recovery against third parties than the cash
seller who was not defrauded. The sources above do not explore these implications,
not do they discuss what constitutes fraud in the cash sale context.
The better approach to the cash seller–defrauding buyer situation is to disre-
gard the presence of fraud. See Gilmore, supra note 14, at 1060:
Cash sale theory developed quite differently [from credit sale theory].
A reasonable man might suppose that if taking goods on credit without the
intention or ability to pay for them is fraud, then the same practice where
the buyer is supposed to pay cash would he the same kind of fraud. The
courts have held, however, in the cash sale situation that something more
serious than "mere' . fraud is involved, something approaching theft—
"larceny by trick or device" as the time-honored phrase runs—and that
consequently the defaulting cash sale buyer gets no tide and can transfer
none to a good faith purchaser.
25 Section 2-403(1)(1)) and (c) of the LiCC reach the same result. See text and
notes 79-82 infra. For commentary on the pre-Code confusion. see Collins, Title to
Goods Paid for with Worthless Check, 13 S. CAI.. L. REV. 340 (1942); Commit, supra note
8; Gilmore, supra note 14, at 1060-62; Vold, .supra note 5; 3 HASTINGS J. 162 (1951);
Note, 28 Ky. L.J., supra note l9; 42 MICH. L. REV. 328 (1943); 14 MINN. L. Rev. 696
(1930); 17 TENN. L. Rev. 272 (1942); 62 YAI.E L.J., supra note 4.
Credit sellers, like cash sellers, lost their rights when good faith purchasers
were involved. In contrast, the conditional seller's position was good. He generally
triumphed over a good faith purchaser for value if he complied with the jurisdiction's
security interest recording requirements. However, if he failed to record in a jurisdic-
tion requiring it, or if the good faith purchaser acquired that status before the seller's
recordation, the conditional seller lost to the purchaser. See VoLD, supra note 3, at
295-302; WILLisToN, supra note 4, 324, 327, 327a. But see id. § 325.
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seller's goods," or where a 'trustee in bankruptcy assumed control of the
buyer's assets. 28 If, however, the third party was the holder of a subsequent
security interest in the goods conveyed,'" courts were divided over who pre-
vailed. Some courts held that the seller prevailed." They reasoned that a
chattel mortgagor or pleclgor (the buyer) could pledge only property in which
he had an interest, although a limited or special interest sufficed."' In a cash
sale, the nonpaying buyer lacked any interest, even a limited interest, in the
seller's goods since the seller retained title. Thus, the pledgor or chattel
mortgagor could convey no interest, the pledgee or chattel mortgagee could
receive no interest, and the seller's rights remained intact. Nevertheless, some
courts reached the opposite result. They argued that the pledgee or chattel
mortgagee qualified as a good faith purchaser for value 32 and, as such, de-
feated the rights of the cash seller."'
Thus, although the cash seller's right under the common law to reclaim
goods for which the buyer did not. pay was not inviolable, it was fairly dura-
ble. With the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, the cash
seller's rights were changed somewhat.
" \lots), supra note 3. at 170-71; Note, 36 DICK.	 REV., supra note 23, at
284-85; 16 MICH. L. REv. 557 (1918). Except in a few states, the defrauded credit
seller also could recover against an attaching lien creditor. See J. BENJAMIN, LAW OF
SALES or PERSONAL. PROPERTY 477-78 (7th Ant. ed. 1899); BURDICK, supra note l4, at
205; F. MECHEM, LAW OF SALES § 924 (1901); F. TIFFANY, LAW OF SALES § 56, at 194
(2d ed. 1908); Voi.n, supra note 3, at 381. A conditional seller could recover from a
lien creditor of his buyer to the same extent that he could recover from a good faith
purchaser. See note 26, supra. See V oi.D. supra note 3, at 296, 300; WILLISTON, supra
note 4, §§ 326, 227, 227a.
28 See Vot.o, supra note 3, at 301. The defrauded credit seller could recover
against the trustee. See Gilmore, supra note 14, at 1060. As for conditional sellers, see
WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 326a, at 273-76.
211 For a brief itemization and description of typical common law security de-
vices, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL Com: 754-57 (1970). Only the most common of these, the pledge and the
chattel mortgage, are considered in this article.
3" See, e.g. , Ison v. Colteld, 261 Ala. 296, 74 So. 2d 484 (1954); First. Guaranty
Bank v. Western Cross-Arm & Mfg. Co., 139 Wash. 614, 619-20, 247 P. 1027, 1029
(1926); 17 MINN. L. REv. 105 (1932); 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 305, at 951 (1939).
But see id. § 23, at 616-17 (1939) (which does not specifically refer to a cash sale). For a
suggestion that the secured party could triumph if he had a properly recorded security
interest, see 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 25, at 34 (1951). It is difficult to see, however, why
recording changes the result since a prerequisite for a pledge or chattel mortgage-a
property interest-is lacking.
Generally, a defrauded credit seller lost to a secured party if the secured
party qualified as a good faith purchaser for value. See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 23,
at 618, § 307, at 954 (1939); 72 C.J.S, Pledges § 26, at 35 (1951); 1 JONES, CHArrEL.
MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 116, at 951 (1933). For the rules regarding
conditional sales, see id. §§ 114, 116, 117; Vot.o, supra note 3, §§ 97, 98, at 296-300; 14
C.J.S. Chattel Morgages § 23, at 618, § 305, at 951-53.
31 JONES, .supra note 30, § 114, at 193 (1933); 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 23,
at 614, 616 (1939); 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 8, at 9 (1951). CI: RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§ 10(3) (1941); 68 Am. JUR. 2c1 Secured Transactions § 138, at. 985-86 (1973).
" See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages §§ 307-09 (1939); 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 26
(1951).
33 Sec text and note 25 supra.
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II. THE CASH SELLER UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In situations involving the sale of goods," the common law of "cash sales"
discussed above is, of course, inapplicable if it conflicts with the UCC. 35
 Al-
though there are no Code sections specifically identified as "cash sale" provi-
sions," sections 2-507(2), 2-511(3), and 2-403 are the Code's counterparts to
the common law rules governing cash sales."
At the core of the legislative scheme are sections 2-507(2) and 2-51 1(3).
Section 2-507(2) provides: "Where payment is clue and demanded on the de-
livery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the
seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment
clue." Like the common law cash sale, this section envisions a nearly simul-
taneous exchange of goods and payment. Section 2-507(2) also states a rule
functionally equivalent to the common law rule that title to goods moves from
seller to buyer upon payment. 38 While section 2-507(2) deals with cash sales
generally, section 2-511(3) concerns "bad check" sales. This section states that
"payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by
dishonor of the check on due presentment." 39 Although this section does not
describe explicitly the status of goods conveyed to the buyer in a "bad check"
transaction, it implies that the buyer cannot retain the goods if his check is
dishonored. Thus, the Code has two principal "cash sale" provisions: 2-511(3)
for "bad check" sales, and 2-507(2) for other "cash sale" situations."
The third member of the cash sale trilogy is section 2-403. It sets out the
unpaid seller's right to the goods relative to the right of the good faith pur-
r" See U.C.C.	 2-102.
See U.C.C. 	 1-103.
36 But see note 79 infra (referring to U.C.C.
	 2-403(1)(c)).
" 7
 The Code deemphasizes the concept of "title" which was so crucial to the
common law governing cash sales. However, § 2-401(1)'s statement that lalny reten-
tion or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to
the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest" might be seen as
the Code recognition of the common law conditional sale. See Dugan, supra note 2, at
343. See also text and notes 7-9 supra.
"" See NORDSTROM, supra note 19, at 501. See also text and notes' 3-6 supra.
" Note also that Comment 4 to § 2-511(3) states: "This Article recognizes that
the taking of a seemingly solvent party's check is commercially normal and proper
and, if due diligence is exercised in collection, is not to be penalized in any way."
4" Section 2-403(I) of the Code further supports the notion that the Code
(especially ** 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)) distinguishes between "bad check" sales and other
cash sales. Section 2-403(1)(b) refers only to "bad check" situations, whereas
§ 2-403(1)(c) deals exclusively with other cash sales.
Nevertheless, it is possible to utilize ** 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) together in a
"bad check" case. Most courts have adopted this approach. See, e.g.. In re Mort Co., 208
F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (bankruptcy decision); In re Lindenbaum's, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 495 (F.D. Pa. 1964) (decision of bankruptcy referee). A few courts, how-
ever, have proceeded solely under § 2-511(3) in "bad check" cases. See, e.g., Gicinto v.
Credithrift of America, 219 Kan. 766, 549 P.2d 870 (1976). Also a few courts have
decided "bad check" cases solely under § 2-507(2). See, e.g., United States v. Wyoming
Nat'l sank of Casper, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1974). Some commentators
agree with these courts that § 2-507(2) is the appropriate "bad check" provision. See,
e.g., NoRDsTkom, supra note 19, at 501-02.
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chaser for value who has purchased the goods from the buyer and the right
of a lien creditor of the buyer, as follows:
(I) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor
had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited
interest acquires rights only to the extent. of the interest purchased.
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a
good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even
though
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dis-
honored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale - ....
(4) The rights of ... lien creditors are governed by the Articles
on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and
Documents of Title (Article 7).
Section 2-403(I) obviously resolves the uncertainty that existed in the common
law in favor of the good faith purchaser. Section 2-403(4), although it men-
tions lien creditors, does not relate the rights of the unpaid seller to those of
the lien Creditor; rather, it ostensibly leaves this problem to be resolved by
other sections of the Code." As For the Article 9 secured party, section
2-403 does not deal explicity with his rights relative to those of the unpaid
cash seller.
The striking similarity between the common law regarding cash sales and
the three UCC provisions outlined above is reinforced by the legislative and
drafting history of these provisions. Although the three cash sale provisions
outlined above replace, to some extent, the common law regarding cash sales,
an examination of the UCC's legislative -12 and drafting 43 history clearly inch-
41 See text and notes 121-23 irrfra, fir a further discussion of this !natter.
42
 In preparing this article, we examined the following legislative history (in-
cluding state legislative hearings, studies, reports. and comments): ARKANSAS UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (with references to prior Arkansas law) (Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1961); Stx.rit PROGRESS REPORT 'Fo THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE BY THE SENATE, FACT
FINDING COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY—PART 1, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1959-60; COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, CALIFORNIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE
PROPOSED CODE (1960) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA CoMMISSION1; CALIFORNIA
COMMERCIAL. CODE (special continents by John A. Bohn & Charles L. Williams and
California case annotations) (West Pub. Co. 1964); LEGLSLATWE COUNCIL. COMMITTEE
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE, REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE TO
THE COLORADO GENERAL. ASSEMBLY (1964); W. STARR, REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY
COMMISSIoN To STUDY AND REPORT UPON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO - rum
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF CONNECTICUT (1959); CONNECTICUT UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
Com: (special comments by William F. Starr and Connecticut case annotations) (West
Pub. Co. 1960); DELAWARE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (special comments by the
Committee to Study and Report on the Uniform Commercial Code for Delaware and
Delaware case annotations) (Edw. 'Thompson Co. and West Pith. Co. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as DELAwARE COMMENTS]; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. Com
(with case annotations and encyclopedic commentary) (West Pub. Co. and Equity Pub.
Cur. 1967); FLORIDA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (special comments by Sam G. Harri-
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cates that neither the Code drafters nor the states enacting the UCC intended
that the Code completely replace the common law. In the cash sale area, this
son, Jr. and Florida case annotations) (Harrison Co. and West Pub. Co. 1966) [here-
inafter cited as FLORIDA COMMENTS]; GEORGIA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE (ency-
clopedic commentary on construction, comparison and contrast with former Georgia
laws by William H. Agnor, E. Bryon Hilley, G. Stanley Joslin, Arthur G. Murphey, I...
Ray Patterson, James C. Quarles, James C. Rehberg & Robert H. Walling) ( EI a rri son
Co. 1962); The UCC and the Hawaii Law, Stefan A. Riesenfield, et. al.; COMMISSION
ON UNIFORMITY OE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES, ILLINOIS ANNOTATIONS TO 'HE
UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE (Burdene Smith Co. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Ii.uNois
COMMISSION]; ILLINOIS UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (special comments by William B.
Davenport, Robert L Bombaugh & Lawrence A. Coles. Jr. and Illinois case annota-
tions) [hereinafter cited as ILLINOIS COMMENTS]; INDIANA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE
(special comments by Harry Pratter & R. Bruce Townsend and Indiana case annota-
tions) (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1963) thereinafter cited as INDIANA COMMENTS]; LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL JUDICIARY CommiTTEE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: KANSAS ANNOTATIONS
(1964) [hereinafter cited as KANSAS JUDICIARY COMMITTEE]; KANSAS UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE (special comments by John E. Howe & Walter I). Navin and Kansas case
annotations) (West Pub. Co. 1968) [hereinafter cited as KANSAS COMMENTS]; LEGISLA-
TIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE: ANALYSIS OF rrs EFFECT ON
EXISTING KENTUCKY LAW (1957) thereinafter cited as KENTUCKY CommiSSION]; MAINE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE (Special comments by Maine Uniform Commercial Code
Committee and Maine case annotations) (West Pub. Co. and Equity Pub. Corp. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as MAINE COMMENTS]; MASSACHUSETTS ANNOTATIONS TO THE PRO-
POSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE (1Midlie Co. and Lawyer's Co-Operative Pub. Co.
1953); MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (special
practice comments by Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr. and Michigan case annotations) (West
Pub. Co. 1967) [hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN COMMENTS]; MINNESOTA UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (special comments by Stanley V. Kinyon and Minnesota case anno-
tations) (West Pub. Co. 1966) [hereinafter cited as MINNESOTA COMMENTS]; MISSISSIPPI
UNIFoRM CommERCIAL CODE (with summary for Mississippi lawyers prepared by the
Uniform Commercial Code Committee) (Harrison Co. and Lawyer's Co-Operative Pub.
Co. 1967); MISSOURI UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (with special ConinlentS and Missouri
case annotations) (Vernon Law Book Co. 1965); NEVADA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
BUREAU, REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE (1964); NEVADA ANNOTATIONS
To 1.4:vista) STATUTES CH. 1 04 (Nevada Legis. Counsel Bur.) (1964); NEW HAMPSHIRE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE (special comments adapted from the New Hampshire
Stale Bar Association Special Committee on the linifin - ni Commercial Code's Annota-
tions to the Proposed Commercial Code) (Equity Pub. Corp. 1961); CommisstoN To
STUDY AND REPORT UPON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE FOR NEW JERSEY, REPORT
To THE GOVERNOR, THE SENATE AND THE ASSEMBLY (Sauey Sage 1960) [hereinafter
cited as NEw JERSEY COMMISSION]; NEW JERSEY UNIFORM CoM•1ERCIAL CODE (exhaus-
tive special study comments by William D. Hawkland, Clarence Ferguson & Egon
Guttman and New Jersey case annotations) (West Pub. Co. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
NEW JERSEY COMMENTS]; NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT FOR 1954 AND
RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1954); NEW YORK LAW
REvISION COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE (1955) [hereinal-
ter cited as NEW YORK COMMISSION]; NEW YORK LAW REVISION CONIMISSION, REPORT
FOR 1956 RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1956); COMMISSION' ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE IN
NEW YORK To THE LEGISLATURE. OF THE STATE or NEw YORK (1961); HoGAN & PENNEY,
ANNOTATIONS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. Coati To THE STATUTORY AND DECISIONAL.
LAW OF NEW YORK (New York Commission on Uniform Stale Laws 1961). in NIcKIN-
NEY's CONS. LAWS OF N.Y. 421-656 (UCC Pamphlet ed.. Edw. Thompson Co. 1963);
NEW YORK STATE COMMISSioN ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS. REFORT oN 1963 PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGts-
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history strongly suggests a general intent to adhere to pre-Code common law,
except. in the case of section 2-403's resolution of the good faith purchaser
priority problem."
LATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1963); NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE or NEW YORK (1964); NEW YORK UNIFORM COM-
mERciAL CODE: (with New York case annotations, special comments by New York
Commission on Uniform State Laws and practice comments by Lester E. Denonn,
Alfred A Buerger, William J. O'Connor, Jr., William C. Pierce, John C. Clarke, Robert
M. Young, Jr., Henry Harfield, Donald J. Rapson, Charles C. Blaine, Robert. M.
Spaulding, Carlos L. Israels & Homer Kripke) (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. ed.,
Edw. Thompson Co. 1964) [hereinafter cited as NEW YORK COMMENTS]; NORTH
CAROLINA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (special comments by Legislative Council
Committee for Study of the Uniform Commercial Code and North Carolina case an-
notations) (Michie Co. 1965) [hereinafter cited as NORTH CAROLINA COMMENTS]; OK-
LAHOMA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE (special comments by William R. Bandy & Robert.
L. Cox and Oklahoma case annotations) (West Pub. Co. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
OKLAulomA COMMENTS]; OREGON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (with case annotations in
separate volume) (Oregon ft.. Comm. on Rules and Resolutions 1963); PENNSYLVANIA
JOINT SCALE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION REPORT, PENNSYLVANIA ANsurrxrioNs TO UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1st ed. 1952; rev. ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as PENNSYL-
VANIA COMMISSION]; PENNSYLVANIA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (with Pennsylvania
Bar Association notes and Pennsylvania case annotations) (1st ed. West Pub. Co. and
G. T. Bisel Co. 1954; rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as PENNSYL-
VANIA COMMENTS]; SOUTH CAROLINA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Special Comments
and case annotations by Robert N. Foster) (Michie Co. 1966); SOUTH DAKOTA UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND A
COMPARISON '1'0 EXISTENT SOUTH DAKOTA LAWS (Vermilion Press 1964); REPORT ON
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Va. Code Commission 1963); VIRGINIA UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (special comments and case annotations by Wilfred J. Ritz) (Michie
Co. 1965); WASHINGTON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (special comments by
Washington Uniform Laws Commission and Washington case annotations) (West Pub.
Co. & Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1966) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON COMMENTS];
WYOMING LECISLATIVE. RESEARCH COMMITTEE, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1960).
This fist omits sonic sources that were unavailable. For a complete listing of legislative
reports, see M. EZER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE BIBLIOGRAPHY 6-16 (1972).
4 " In preparing this article, we examined all major prior drafts and prior offi-
cial texts including: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1940 DRAFT WITH COMMENTS
(ALI & NCCUSL 1949) [hereinafter cited as "1949 Draft"]; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT—TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION (ALI & NCCUSL May
1950) [hereinafter cited as "1950 Draft"]; SEPTEMBER 1050 REVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2,
ARTICLE 4 AND ARTICLE 9 (ALI & NCCUSL 1950); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1951
FINAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (ALI & NCCUSL 1952) [hereinafter cited as "1952
Draft"]; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT-TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION
(ALI & NCCUSL 1952) [hereinafter cited as "1952 Official Draft"]; RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR CHANGES IN THE TEXT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEAT AND COMMENTS EDITION (UCC Enlarged
Editorial Bd. April 30, 1953); RECOMMENDATIONS OE"FHE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
CHANGES IN THE TEXT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OFFICIAL
DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITI0N UCC Enlarged Editorial Bd. June 1, 1953);
1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (ALI & NCCUSL 1956); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1957 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH
COMMENTS (ALI & NCCUSL 1957); 1958 SUPPLEMENT TO THE 1957 OFFICIAL TEXT
WITH COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (ALI & NCCUSL Dec. 1958);
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For example, section 2-507(2) adds generality to the Uniform Saks Act, 45
but, nevertheless, is very similar in effect to the common law." The com-
ments to Michigan's Code explicitly link section 2-507(2) with this pre-Code
law of cash sales:
[Section 2-507(2)'s] concept of conditional delivery has no counter-
part in the USA [Uniform Saks Act]. It appears to give the seller the
right to repossess the goods if payment is not promptly made. This
goes beyond the protection afforded by the seller's lien in Section 54
of the USA which is dependent upon the seller's possession of the
goods for its effectiveness. Indeed, this provision reminds one of the
seller's rights under the "cash sale" concept. 47
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE: 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (ALI & NCCUSL
1959); UN/FORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (ALI &
NCCUSL 1962); REPORT No. 1 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC Perm. Editorial Bd. Oct. 31, 1962); REPORT No. 2 OF
THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL. BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: REPORT ON
VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING STATES (UCC Perm. Editorial Bd. Oct. 3, 1964);
NON-UNIFORM AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN ENACTING JURIS-
DICTIONS: Vol, 1—Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4; Vol. 2—Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8; Vols. 3 and
4—Article 9 (UCC Penn. Editorial Bd. Oct. 18, 1965); SUPPLEMENT TO NON-UNIFORM
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN ENACTING JURISDICTIONS (UCC
Perm. Editorial Bd. October 3, 1966).
Some commentators have questioned the use of prior drafts of texts and
comments as legislative history. An earlier draft Code section warned: "Prior drafts of
text and comments may not be used to ascertain legislative intent." 1952 Official Draft
§ 1-102(3)(g). Although later drafts did not include this provision, some commentators
believe it. should have been retained. WHITE Sc SUMMERS, SUM note 29, at 10. The
New York Law Revision Commission, however, recommended deletion of the warning:
Section 1-102(3)(g), together with paragraph (1) referring to the com-
ments constitutes an attempt to establish a proper boundary between what
shall be considered as relevant "legislative history" and what shall not be so
considered. The most diligent search has revealed no precedent for such a
provision.
The validity of such a provision is doubtful. Traditionally, the courts
have determined what materials should be considered as relevant "legisla-
tive history"; in other words, the questions of admissibility of extrinsic aids
has been a matter for the court's decision and courts have generally been
liberal in examining "the events leading up to the introduction of the bill
0111 of which the statute under consideration developed."
NEW YORK COMMISSION, Sttpra, note 42, at 38.
44 Secton 2-507(2) is one of the least controversial provisions in the Code. The
survival of the original version of § 2-507(2), despite a dcizen or so revisions of the
Code, demonstrates its noncontroversial and noninnovative nature.
45 See INDIANA COMMENTS, supra note 42; MICHIGAN COMMENTS, supra note 42;
NEW JERSEY COMMISSION, Supra note 42; NEW JERSEY COMMENTS, St/pra note 42. The
Uniform Sales Act did not have an explicit "cash sale" provision. See note 14 supra.
46 See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, SUpra note 42; NEW JERSEY COMMISSION, supra
note 42; NEW JERSEY COMMENTS, supra note 42; OKLAHOMA COMMENTS, SUPra note-42.
47 See MICHIGAN COMMENTS, supra note 42. But see INDIANA COMMENTS, supra
note 42, Comment 2, which states: "Broadly interpreted, all unpaid sellers would have
this right of replevin. But this interpretation would make a nullity of section 2-702
which specifically provides for the seller's right to 'reclaim' the goods." Actually. the
existence of a reclamation right in § 2-507(2) would not "make a nullity" of § 2-702
since the latter section applies only to credit sales, not to cash sales.
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Consequently, as far as the buyer and seller are concerned, the drafting and
legislative history of section 2-507(2) seem to indicate that section 2-507(2)
preserves the seller's common law rights in the "cash sale" situation.
The legislative history of section 2-511(3) also indicates that the drafters
did not intend to change the common law regarding "bad check" sales. Al-
though section 2-51 I (3) is new 48 and has no counterpart in the Unifbrm Sales
Act: 1 " it. nonetheless accords with the common law in most. jurisdictions. 5 "
A. The Cash Seller's Rights Against the Nonpaying Buyer
As rioted above, despite an occasional judicial statement. to the contrary, 51
sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) and the cases decided under them strikingly
resemble the common law as it. related to the seller's rights against the non-
paying buyer. Perhaps the most important similarity between the common law
and the Code is that both recognize the unpaid seller's right to reclaim his
" See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION, .supra note 42; KENTUCKY COMMISSION, SUpra
note 42; New VoRK. CoMMENTS„tripra note 42.
49 See DELAWARE COMMENTS, SUpra note 42; MAINE. COMMENTS. Supra note 42;
PENNSYLVANIA COMMENTS, supra note 42.
51' See DELAwARE COMMENTS, supra note 42; FLORIDA COMMENTS, supra note 42;
ILLINOIS COmmENTS, supra note 42; KANSAS jUDiciARY COMMITTEE, supra note 42; KAN-
SAS COMMENTS, supra note 42; KENTUCKY COMMISSioN„supra note 42; MAINE COM-
MF,NTS, supra note 42; MINNESOTA COMMEN'T'S, supra note 42; NORTH CAROLINA
COMMENTS, supra note 42; OHLAtiorviA CommENTs, Supra note 42; PENNSYLVANIA
COMMENTs, supra note 42.
In addition, the history strongly suggests that this section would allow a seller
to recover the goods frorn the buyer upon dishonor of a check given in payment. See
DELAWARE COMMENTs, supra note 42; FLORIDA COMMENTS, supra note 42; PENNSYLVANIA
COMMENTS, supra note 42. The Kansas legislative history contains the hollowing state-
ment: "As to the seller's recourse against. the goods under the Code, see Section
2-702," See KAssAs JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, supra note 42.
There is agreement that the section has no effect upon the rights of third
parties. see KENTUCKY COMMISSION, supra note 42, these rights being governed by
§ 2-403. See DELAWARE COMMENTS, supra note 42; FLORIDA COMMENTS, supra note 42;
ler.m.ns CommeNTs„mpra note 42; New YORK COMMENTS, supra note 42; OKLAHOMA
COMMENTS, .Hipra note 42.
Although the drafting history ()I' §§ 2-403(I) and (4) was rather convoluted,
their basic purpose was always quite clear—to resolve the cash seller-good faith pur-
chaser priority question which was disputed and uncertain under the prior law. In con-
trast to the precision with which § 2-403(1) answers the question of priority between
these two parties, § 2-403(4) leaves the rights of other purchasers and lien creditors to
Artides 6, 7, and 9. However, these Articles fail to provide any definitive resolution to
the relative rights of cash sellers and lien creditors, a failure which was recognized by
the Permanent Editorial Board when it stated that "There is no suggestion in the
official text that. the rights of lien creditors are exclusively governed by the Articles
referred to REpORT No. 2 OF THE. PERMANENT EurrORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL Cone: REPORT ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN AnorriNo STATES (UCC: Perin.
Editorial Bd. Oct. 31, 1964).
51 See, e.g., Gross v. Powell. 288 Minn. 386, 392-94, 181 N.W.2d 113, 117-18
(1970); Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgenson, 245 Or. 362, 365-66, 421 P.2d 978. 980 (1966).
See also U.C.C. 4§ 2-401 and Comment 1. Bul see Stumbo v. Paul B. Hutt Lumber Co.,
86 Or. 1321, 444 P.2d 564, 571 (1970) (§ 2-507(2) "represents whatever remains of the
'cash sale' doctrine under the Code").
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goods. 52
 There is a disagreement about the source of the right in Code cases,
however, since neither section 2-507(2) nor section 2-511(3) contain an explicit
reclamation provision." Some courts view the right as more or less inherent
in the general cash sale provision, section 2-507(2)." Other courts create the
right. by grafting the ten-clay right. to reclaim in section 2-702(2)" onto sec-
tion 2-507(2). 56
 Still other courts view the seller's right to reclaim goods as
inherent in section 2-51 1(3), the "bad check" provision. 57
A great many, perhaps most, courts that view the cash seller's right of
reclamation as connected in some way to section 2-507(2) also believe that
section 2-702(2) restricts this right to a certain extent. They disagree, how-
ever, on how section 2-702(2) limits this tight. Comment 3 to section 2-507(2)
suggests that there are two separate, though almost indistinguishable, limita-
52 On the pre-Code reclamation rigtt granted the unpaid cash seller, see text
and note 22 supra. For an argument that § 2-507(2) substantially embodies the pre-
Code "cash sale" doctrine, see 77 CoLum. L. REV., supra note 2, at 940-43.
53 The legislative history of §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) suggests that the reclama-
tion right is inherent to those sections. See text and note 47 supra. But see the Indiana
Code Comment in note 47 supra.
Also possibly relevant here is U.C.C. § 2-703(1), which states, in relevant part, that
"where the buyer fails to make a payment due on or before delivery ... the aggrieved
seller may ... cancel." See Wiseman, .supra note 2, at 119, 151; 77 CoLum. L. REV.,
supra note 2, at 938-39 n.29.
" See In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968)
(bankruptcy decision); In re Mort Co., 208 F. Stipp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (bank-
ruptcy decision); Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313,
317 (Colo. C:t. App. 1976); In re Lindenbaum's Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495. 496
(E.D. Pa. 1964) (decision of bankruptcy referee).
55 Section 2-702(2) provides:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten
days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made
io the particular seller in writing within three 'MIMI'S before delivery the
ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the
seller nay not. base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or
innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
See In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 938, 941 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(decision of bankruptcy judge) (dictum); In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 384, 386 (N.D. Incl. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Kirk
Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746, 748-49 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (decision of bank-
ruptcy, judge); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-07 (S.D.
Iowa 1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge); Greater Louisville Auto• Auction, Inc. v.
Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 19(15). See also United Slates v. Wyoming
Nat'l Bank of Casper, 505 1.7 ,2d 1064, 1068 (10th Or. 1974) (stating that § 2-507(2)
should not apply where the rights of third parties are involved, and seeming to regard
§ 2-702(2) as the appropriate provision in such cases).
57 See. Gicinto v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 219 Kan. 766, 769, 549 P.2d 870,
873 (1976); Conyngham & Co. v. Frank, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 762, 767, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 83, 86 (C. P. Luzerne County 1975). But see In re Bar-Wood, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 828, 829 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge) (recognizing an inherent
right of reclamation itt § 2-511(3), but stating that this section only operates as "be-
tween the parties," and suggesting that § 2-702(2) must be utilized in third-party cases).
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tions on a cash seller's right to reclaim goods: a requirement that the seller
"follow up" his reclamation rights or waive the conditional nature of his deliv-
ery of the goods to the buyer; 58 and a requirement that the seller reclaim the
goods within ten days. 59 Most courts apply only the ten-day limitation on the
seller's right under section 2-507(2). 60 The one court that discussed both of
the limitations effectively blurred them."' In addition, at least one court
found section 2-702(2)'s exception to the ten-day limitation for situations
where the buyer has made a written misrepresentation of solvency" 2 also
applicable to cash sellers." In contrast to these cases decided under section'
2-507(2), courts proceeding under the "bad check" provision of 2-511(3) sim-
ply do not apply any of the limitations of section 2-702(2)."
as The one case discussing this reiluirement has regarded it as necessitating "a
regaining of possession or a bona fide attempt to do so." In re Colacci's of America,
Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974) (bankruptcy decision).
59 Cases holding this ten-day demand requirement applicable to § 2-507(2) re-
clamations include: In re Samuels & Co., Inc., 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Gir. 1976)
(bankruptcy decision) (Appendix adopting dissenting opinion of Judge Godbold, 510
F.2d at 154); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1968) (bank-
ruptcy decision); In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (N.D.
Ind. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 746, 748-49 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Fairfield
Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-07 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (decision of bank-
ruptcy judge). On the details of this requirement in the context of § 2-702(2), see
Mann & Phillips, supra note 1, at 614-15.
" See note 59 supra.
6t See In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1974)
(bankruptcy decision).
02
 For the statutory language, see note 55 supra. On the details of this re-
quirement in the credit sale context, see Mann & Phillips, supra note 1, at 615-16. Note
that some cases have held that a check may constitute a misrepresentation of solvency.
See id. at 615 n.43 and accompanying text. (f, In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 938, 941-42 (F.D. Pa. 1977) (decision of bankruptcy judge) (discussing cases).
63 See In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-08 (S.D. Iowa
1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge). Although the close linkage of the "ten-day de-
mand" and "written misrepresentation" aspects of § 2-702(2), sec note 55 supra, creates
some justification for this application of § 2-702(2)'s 'requirements to § 2-507(2), it
clearly goes beyond the express command of Comment 3, and, moreover, tends to mix
"fraud" and "cash sale" rationales to an undesirable degree. On the relationship be-
tween the "written misrepresentation" limitation and common law fraud, see Mann &
Phillips, supra note I, at 616-17.
64 But see In re Bar-Wood, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828 (S.D. Fla, 1974)
(decision of bankruptcy judge). In this case, the judge stated that § 2-511(3) would
apply as between the parties in a bad check case, but he seemed to feel that § 2-511(3)
could provide no reclamation right in a "third party" situation. Thus, he turned to
§ 2-702(2) and held that the seller lost his right of reclamation under this section. The
judge concluded that the seller had not demanded return of the goods within the ten
day period, and that the buyer's check did not, on these facts, constitute a written
misrepresentation of solvency.
In cases proceeding solely under § 2-511(3), the ten-day limitation on the
right to reclaim is inapplicable because the comments to § 2-511(3), unlike those to
§ 2-507(2), do not refer to the limitation. If a seller delays too long before exercising his
January 1979]	 THE CASH SELLER UNDER THE UCC
	 383
Although many courts impose some of section 2-702(2)'s limitations on
the cash seller's right to reclaim his goods, any application of section 2-702(2)
to cash sales, beyond that which Comment 3 to section 2-507 permits, is int-
proper."5
 in fact, the Comment's suggestion that. section 2-702(2)'s ten-clay
limit on reclamation applies to the cash seller is undesirable. In the "bad
check" situation, the application of section 2-702(2)'s ten-day limitation works
an unnecessary hardship on the seller since in most instances he will not dis-
cover that the check is bad within the ten days. As one commentator has put
it:
[A] ten-day period for reclaiming under section 2-507(2) may be un-
duly short in situations in which a check has been returned for in-
sufficient funds. Such a check may have passed thrcalgh several in-
dorsers and banks, not being returned to the seller until after the
buyer has had the goods for more than ten days. A seller who has
negotiated or transferred a check in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness ought. not to be held to have waived his demanded payment
solely because the banking process requires more than ten clays to
inform the seller that the check was dishonored."
Even in cash sale situations not involving "bad checks," there are several
arguments against grafting section 2-702(2)'s limitations onto section
2-507(2)'s reclamation right.. First, section 2-702(2) by its terms applies only to
sales "on credit"; cash sales are not "on credit,"li 7
 Second, while Comment 3
to section 2-507 suggests some connection between that section and section
2-702(2), the Comment nevertheless presupposes a right of reclamation
inherent in section 2-507(2)." Moreover, while the comments to Code sec-
tions may be helpful in explaining the Code, they are not. positive law and
cannot impose restrictions that the Code itself does not impose." Finally, the
right to reclaim, he nevertheless is subject to the defense of common law waiver. On
common law waiver, see notes 23-24 supra.
65
 This argument has several implications for the rest of the article. It coin-
cides with the argument that § 2-403 alone should govern "cash sale" priorities, see
text and notes 78-126 infra, since it militates against employing § 2-702(3) for that
purpose. It also has definite implications for the cash seller—versus—lien creditor prior-
ity question. See text and notes 121-25 infra. This, in turn, affects resolution of the
cash seller—versus—trustee question under § 70(c). See text and notes 128-36 infra.
"" NoRDsTitom, supra mile 19, at. 503. See also Dugan, supra. note 2, at 346-49;
Wiseman, supra note 2. at 142-43.
"' See Dugan. supra note 2, at 341-42.
" Moreover, even if there is some connection between § 2-54)7(2) and
§ 2-702(2), as Comment 3 to § 2-507(2) suggests. § 2-702(2) is not the source of the
unpaid cash seller's right of reclamation. Rather, this right of reclamation is inherent
in § 2-507(2). Our view is supported by the "follow up- limitation also expressed in
Comment 3 to § 2-507(2). This "follow up" limitation clearly implies the preexistence
of a reclamation right in § 2-507(2) because, without referring to § 2-702(2), it limits an
unpaid cash seller's reclamation right.
The tendency among courts to graft § 2-702(2) onto other sections of the
Code is a particularly egregious error in the case of § 2-511(3), whose only conceivable
link to § 2-702(2) is the statement. in Comment Ii to the effect that post-dated check
sales are to be governed by § 2-702(2).
"" See Dugan, supra note 2, at 346.
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historical antecedents of sections 2-507(2), 2-51 1(3), and 2-702(2) militate
against linking section 2-702(2) with either of the other two sections, Sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3), as legislative history indicates, reflect the common law
surrounding cash sales, including the common law right to reclaim.'" Section
2-702(2) also reflects the common law. Its common law basis, however, is not
the right to reclaim goods for which the buyer has not paid but, rather, the
right to rescind for fraud." Thus, the common law ancestor of sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3), and that of section 2-702(2), are unrelated." There is
no basis, therefore, for now linking these provisions.
For courts that balk at finding an inherent right to reclaim in section
2-507(2) and 2-511(3), and, therefore, utilize section 2-702(2), an alternative
solution is section 1-103. 73 This section incorporates the common law, includ-
ing the cash seller's common law right of reclamation, into the Code in the
absence of a contradictory Code provision, thereby making it unnecessary for
courts to resort to section 2-702(2) to find a basis for the reclamation right.
B. The Cash Seller's Rights Against Third Parties
As was the case at common law, 74 the cash seller's reclamation right.
under the UGC" may be affected by the rights of third parties to the goods.
In this regard, there are three types of third parties: 76 good faith purchasers
of the goods, parties who have obtained from the buyer an Article 9 security
interest in the goods, and lien creditors of the buyer who have attached the
goods." Neither section 2-507(2), the general cash sale provision, nor section
2-511(3), the "bad check" provision, describe the rights of the Code cash seller
relative to the rights of these third parties. In fact, both sections state that
they apply only to the relationship between seller and buyer."' In our c.ipin-
7 ° See text and notes 46-50 supra.
7' See Mann Sc Phillips, supra note 1, at 616-17.
72 See text and notes 25-26, 29, 32-33 supra. For a fuller comparison, compare
text and notes 3-33 supra with Mann & Phillips, supra note 1, at 6l2-13.
73 Section 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions."
74 Sec text and notes 25-33 supra.
" Front this point on, the terms "seller under §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3),"
"Code cash seller," and "cash seller," will be used more or less interchangeably.
" These three types of third parties arc not necessarily mutually exclusive. For
example, holders of Article 9 security interests may be deemed good faith purchasers
for value. See text and notes 83-87 infra.
77 Section 9-301(3)'s definition of the term "lien creditor" includes a trustee in
bankruptcy whose rights we discuss later in this article.
" U.C.C. § 2-507(2) states: "Where payment is due and demanded on the
delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to
retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment due." (emphasis
added). U.C.C. § 2-511(3) provides in relevant part: "payment by check is conditional
and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment."
(emphasis added). See, e.g., In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1244 (5th Cir. 1976)
(bankruptcy decision); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank of' Casper, 505 F.2d 1064,
1068 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384,
386-87 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Bar-Wood, [tie., 15
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828, 829 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
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ion, section 2-403 of the Code should govern all cash sale priority questions.
We believe that section 2-403 provides the most complete solution to these
priority questions, is the simplest priority provision to apply, produces the
most uniform results, has the most direct statutory links to sections 2-507(2)
and 2-511(3), and was intended by the Code drafters and the enacting states
to serve as the key priority provision.
To support our conclusion that section 2-403 should govern UCC cash
sale priority questions, we shall first. discuss the rights of the cash seller in
relation to those of good faith purchasers. We shall then examine the relative
rights of cash sellers and parties who have obtained from the buyer an Article
9 security interest in the goods. Finally, we shall look at the conflicting claims
of cash sellers and attaching lien creditors of the buyer.
1. The Cash Seller and the Good Faith Purchaser for Value
We turn first to the seller's rights relative to those of the good faith
purchaser for value. Section 2-403(1) provides that the cash seller's right to
reclaim his goods lapses if the buyer transfers the goods to a good faith
purchaser for value. 7" Section 2-403 produces this result by enabling a buyer
of goods with voidable title to transfer good title to a good l'aith purchaser for
value. This section then lists the two cash sale situations in which the buyer
acquires voidable title: where delivery was in exchange for a check which is
later dishonored,'" and where the parties agreed that. the transaction was to
be a "cash sale." 81
 Since these two situations embrace all cash sale cases, sec-
tion 2-403(1) precludes an unpaid cash seller from recovering the goods from
a good faith purchaser for value."
7 " Section 2-403(1) provides in relevant part:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had
power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A persm with voidable
title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the
purchaser has such power even though
(h) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored,
or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to he a "cash sale"„
§ 2-403(1)(b).
§ 2-403(1)(c).
" There are few reported cases involving actual "buyers"—buyers other than
lien creditors or secured panics who 'nay also qualify as rid faith purchasers. All
these cases permitted the unpaid cash seller to recover the goods because the buyer
failed to establish his good faith for value status. See Ranchers & Farmers Livestock
Co. v. Honey, 552 l'.2d 313 (Colo. App. 1976) (subsequent purchaser had notice of
unpaid cash seller's § 2-507 claim); Conyngham & Co. v. Frank, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 762,
764-65, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. 83. 84-85 (1975) (good faith purchaser for value cannot
contract or pay for goods before delivery of the goods to the buyer despite
§ 1-201(44)(c) of the Code which defines "value" to include preexisting contracts for
purchase). However, once a third party proves that he is a good faith purchaser for
value, he will inevitably prevail over the cash seller. For the definitions of "good faith,"
"purchaser," and "value," see U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), (32), (33), (44).
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2. The Cash Seller and the Article 9 Secured Party
Section 2-403(1) also precludes the unpaid cash seller from recovering the
goods front the holder of a perfected Article 9 security interest in the
goods." Although section 2-403(1) ostensibly applies only to good faith pm --
chasers for value, secured parties usually qualify as good faith purchasers be-
cause of the Code's broad definitions of "purchase" and "purchaser." Section
1-201(32) of the UCC states: "Purchase includes taking by sale, discount,
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or reissue, gift, or any other volun-
tary transaction creating an interest in property." Section 1-201(33) of the
UCC defines "purchaser" as "a person who takes by purchase." Since the
Code's definition of "value" includes security fOr a preexisting claim," even a
secured party with an alter-acquired property clause is a purchaser for
value." Thus, so long as the secured party acts in good faith he will be
" For a discussion of the cash seller's rights as against some of the common
law counterparts of the Article 9 secured party. sec text and notes 27-31 strpm.
A recent case decided under the Code took an approach similar to the com-
mon law. Gicimo v. Credithrift of America, Inc., 219 Kan. 766, 549 1).2d 870 (1976).
Although this case also involved non-Code statutory title provisions dealing with motor
vehicle certificates of title, the court. held that on the basis of § 2-155(3) the cash seller
prevailed over a secured party because title did not pass to the buyer and, therefore,
the buyer had nothing to which the secured party's security interest could attach. The
court stated:
[W]hen a check is dishonored when presented there is no payment,
title does not pass, and the seller can maintain replevin against the
buyer or a third party who is not an innocent purchaser.The Uni-
form Commercial Code is in accord, [section 2-511(3)] providing that
"payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the par-
ties by dishonor of the check of due presentment. -
Credithrift, [the secured party], recognized the force of the
foregoing authorities and now concedes that title never passed to
Norman [the buyer), The result is that Creclit.hrift couldn't acquire a
security interest in any of' the [goods], since [section 9-2031 required
the debtor to acquire an interest in the collateral before a security
interest could attach. The security agreement was thus unenforceable
even as between the signatories.
219 Kan. at 769, 549 P.2d at 873 (citations (omitted).
The court's conclusion concerning attachment seems erroneous. Section
9-203(I)(c) requires the debtor-buyer to have rights in the collateral. "Rights- does not
necessarily mean "title. - However, even if' it does, title passes under § 2-401(2) (unless
the parties explicitly agree otherwise) when the seller delivers the goods to the buyer.
Moreover, under § 2-403(1), the buyer receives "voidable title" in cash sale and bad
check cases. Voidable title should he sufficient "rights in the collateral'' for a security
interest to attach. Finally. under § 2-501(1). "rights - may be acquired as early as iden-
tification of' the goods to the contract, for the buyer obtains a special property anti all
insurable interest. in the goods. This, too, may he sufficient "rights - in the collateral to
permit attachment. See 1 P. coocAN. w. Floc:, ', & I). \Y OG•'S, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE § 4.06, at 311-14 (1976). For an argument to
the contrary, sec 77 CoLunt L. Rey., Siipia note 2, at 951-55.
" 4 U.C.C. § 1-20 I (44 )(b).
" 	 e.g.., In re Daley, Inc.. 17 U.C.C. Rep, Serv. 433, 435 (1). Mass. 1975)
(bankruptcy decision); In re Haywood Woolen Co.. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1107, 1111-12
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deemed a good faith purchaser for value, 8 " and therefore will enjoy priority
over the reclamation claims of an unpaid cash seller."
Although no courts have gone this far, section 2-403(1) also precludes the
unpaid cash seller from recovering goods from the holder of an unperfected
security interest in the goods." Since an unperfected security interest is in-
distinguishable from a perfected one with respect to satisfying the require-
ments of purchase, value, and good faith, the holder of an unperfected sec-
u ri ty interest should be a good faith purchaser for value who therefore takes
free of the claims of an unpaid cash seller. 89
(D. Mass. 1967) (decision of bankruptcy referee); Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co.,
251 Or. 20, 41-43, 444 P.2d 564, 574-75 (1968). Some commentators. however, argue
that an Article 9 secured party with a security interest in after-acquired property has
not given value unless the secured party has made additional advances in reliance
upon the buyer's possession of the goods. See Wiseman, supra note 2, at 144-46;
McDonnell, supra note 2, at 454-56; 77 Coi,urt. L. REV., SUpra note 2, at 955-56.
8" For a case in which the secured party did not show good faith, see In re
American Food Purveyors. Inc., 17 U.O.C. Rep. Serv. 436, 441-44 (N.D. Ga. 1974)
(decision of bankruptcy judge). The various opinions in In re Samuels & Co., 483 F.2d
557 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'', sub nom. Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100 (1974) (per curiam),
modified, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd en bane, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976),
provide contrasting views of what constitutes "good faith" in the cash seller—versus-
secured  party Situation.
"T In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2(1 1238, 1242-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Stowers v. Mahon, 429 U.S. 834 (1976) (bankruptcy decision); United States v. Wyom-
ing Nat'l Bank of Casper, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974); First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Jim Payne Pontiac, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 768, 774-76 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 174,
519 P.2d 354. 358-59; Peerless Equipment Co. v. Azle State Bank, 559 S.W.2d 114,
115-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
"" See Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166,
519 P.2(1 354 (1974). The Colorado Supreme Court reached this result by basing the
superiority of the unperfected security interest on § 9-301 of; the Code. As the court
stated:
The declared policy of the Colorado U11	 Commercial Code re-
quires that a security agreement shall be effective between the parties and
against. other parties, except as is specifically provided otherwise in the
Code. [U.C.C. 9-2011. The priority provisions of the Code delineate
which interests in goods are superior to unperfected security interests.
[U.C.C. § 9-301]. The right to reclaim goods conveyed as part of a cash
sale transaction created by [U.C.C. 2-507(2)1, is not one of the interests
which is listed as having priority over an unperfected security interest.
Therefore the bank's unperfected security interest, under the facts pre-
sented in this case, had priority over Guy Martin Buick's right to reclaim
the automobiles.
hi. at 175-76, 519 P.2d at 359-60. See also United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank of
Casper, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974) (unclear whether security interest was
perfected or unperfected). This reasoning applies with equal force to reclamation
rights arising under § 2-511(3). since they too are omitted from § 9-301.
"" This result is not inconsistent with the policy behind requiring the perfec-
tion of security interests because perfection is required to protect parties who might
rely on the debtor-buyer's possession of the goods, and a cash seller does not need this
protection.
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3. The Cash Seller and the Attaching Lien Creditor
The rights of the unpaid cash seller relative to those of the attaching lien
creditor"" under the UCC are not as clear as the cash seller's rights in relation
to either the good faith purchaser for value or the holder of a security in-
terest in the goods. Although the relative priorities of the reclaiming cash
seller and a lien creditor were well established at common law—the cash seller
prevailed "—their relative priorities under the UCC is unclear. Present case
law is split over how to resolve the priority problem. Some courts take the
view that the attaching lien creditor qualfics as a good faith purchaser for
value and, thus, under section 2-403(1), has a right to the goods superior to
the unpaid cash seller. Other courts classify the unpaid cash seller's right to
reclaim goods under section 2-507(2)," 2 the general cash sale provision, as an
unperfected security interest which is subordinate to the rights of a lien cred-
itor under section 9-301(1)(13). Still other courts conclude from section
2-702(3)"" that the seller's right to reclaim goods, as it is set out in section
2-702(2), is subordinate to the lien creditor's right to the goods. Although all
three of these approaches reach the same result, we believe that this result is
wrong; an attaching lien creditor should not prevail over a reclaiming cash
seller. A brief discussion of these three approaches illustrates the legal and
practical problems with them.
We turn first to the view that the attaching lien creditor qualifies as a
good faith purchaser for value and, thus, enjoys priority over the reclaiming
cash seller under section 2-403(1)." Only two cases have discussed this ap-
proach; each case reached a different result.• One case cryptically stated:
The fact that the holder of a voluntary lien—including an Article
Nine interest—is a "purchaser" under the Code is of great signifi-
cance to a proper understanding and resolution of this case under
Article Two and Article Nine. The Code establishes that purchasers
can take from a defaulting cash buyer, [section 2-403]. Lien creditors
are included in the definition of purchasers, [sections 1-201(32) and
1-201(33) 1 A lien is an Article Nine interest, [Comments to section
9-101 and 9-102]. The existence of an Article Nine interest presup-
"" The Code's definition of a lien creditor is contained in § 9-301(3): "A 'lien
crcitor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attach-
ment, levy or the like and includes a trustee in bankruptcy front the date of the
filing of the petition ...."
" 1
 See text and note 32 supra.
"2
 There are no cases discussing the relative rights of a reclaiming § 2-511(3)
seller and a lien creditor. But see In re Bar-Wood, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828, 829
(S.D. Fla. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge). Bar-Wood suggests that, in third party
cases, the "had check" seller must rely on § 2-702(2). If § 2-702 is the applicable
provision, § 2
-702(3)'s possible subordination of the seller to a lien creditor becomes
relevant. See text. and notes 110-20 infra.
"3 For the text of § 2-702(3), see note 112 itifm.
"4 For the text of § 2-403(1), see note 79 supra.
"5 In re Samuels	 Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy decision);
In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (decision of bank-
ruptcy judge) ("The trustee in bankruptcy is not a good faith purchaser, but he is a
lien creditor as defined in [§ 9-301(3)].").
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poses the debtors having rights in the collateral sufficient to permit
attachment, [section 9-204]. Therefore, since a defaulting cash buyer
has the power to transfer a security interest to a lien creditor, includ-
ing an Article Nine secured party, the buyer's rights in the property,
however marginal, must he sufficient to allow attachment of a lien.
And this is true even if, arguendo, I were to agree that the cash seller
is granted reclamation rights under Article Two."
It is unclear from this discussion whether the court. considers a lien creditor to
be a good faith purchaser for value. In any 'event., the quoted passage is dic-
tum since the "lien holder" in this case actually was an Article 9 secured
party." 7
Whether dictum or holding, however, the court's reasoning is faulty and
its conclusion is ludicrous. Even if a lien creditor qualifies as a good faith
purchaser for value," section 2-403(4) states: The rights of ... lien creditors
are governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Trans-
fers (Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7)." Since this language indi-
cates that section 2-403 governs the rights of good faith purchasers for value,
and since it states that section 2-403 does not govern the rights of lien cred-
itors, it is clear that lien creditors are not good faith purchasers for value.
Thus, section 2-403 specifically excludes lien creditors from its purview. The
view that lien creditors are good faith purchasers with priority over unpaid
cash sellers, therefore, is unconvincing.• 9
" In re Samuels	 Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (5th Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy
decision) (emphasis in original).
" 7
 Id. at 1241.
"R In the passage quoted above from In re Samuels & Co., id., the court used
§ 1-201(32) to reach its dubious conclusion that a lien creditor qualifies as a good faith
purchaser for value under the Code. Although § 1-201(32) defines "purchase ." to in-
clude taking by "lien" or any other "voluntary transaction creating an interest in prop-
erty," lien creditors are not holders of voluntary liens and, therefore, fall outside the
Code's definition of "purchasers."
In addition, the court's characterization of the lien as an Article 9 security
interest is incorrect. The Code sections that the court cites in the passage quoted above
do nut support. its conclusion. Moreover, § 9-104 of the Code, a provision which the
court ignored, repudiates the court's conclusion. Section 9-104 provides: "This Article
does not apply ... (c) to a lien given by statute or other rule of law for services or
materials; or .. (h) to a right represented by a judgment , , ." Consequently, Article
9 does not apply to judicial liens such as "the lien of an unsecured creditor who arms
himself with a judgment and levies," WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 757 11.14, or
liens such as mechanics liens. Since a lien creditor is not an Article 9 secured party, he
cannot argue that he is a good faith purchaser for value because Article 9 secured
parties enjoy such status.
Finally. there are sound policy reasons for not regarding lien creditors as
good faith purchasers for value. The lien creditor, unlike the typical good faith pur-
chaser for value, does not rely on the ostensible ownership or voidable title of the
buyer-debtor. Therefore, there is no policy reason for granting good faith purchaser
status to the lien creditor, and thereby giving the lien creditor priority over the cash
seller.
" 9
 A similar argument can be made from the 1962 version of § 2-702(3) which
states that the seller's right to reclaim under § 2-702(2) "is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this
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The argument that the unpaid cash seller's right to reclaim goods under
sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) 1 '1" is an unperfected security interest. suborcli-
nate to the rights of a lien creditor '"' is equally unconvincing. The few cases
that have discussed this contention are divided over its validity.'" 2
One reason we believe this argument fails is that classifying the cash sell-
er's reclamation right as a security interest is at odds with the nature of the
cash sale. A security interest typically stems from a credit transaction where the
seller retains an interest in the goods as security for the purchase price. The
cash sale, however, is not a credit transaction "" and the cash seller does not
retain an interest in the goods.'" The cash seller's reclamation right is more
like a power to undo the transaction than a power to recover based on a
retention of tide. Although section 2-401(1) of the Code provides that "(ably
retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped
or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect. to a reservation of a security
interest.," this provision seems to apply only when the seller expressly retains
title."' Moreover, section 2-401(1) should not govern cash sales since it ap-
pears to be the descendant of the conditional sale"' which was more or less
distinct from the cash sale at common law. Consequently, it is incongrous to
view the cash seller's reclamation right. as a security interest..
Another reason for rejecting the argument that the cash seller's reclama-
tion right is a security interest is that the list of Article 2 security interests,
Article (Section 2-403).'' This version of § 2-702(3) clearly shows that, under the Code,
good faith purchasers and lien creditors are distinctly different parties.
"" Most of what follows probably pertains more to § 2-507 than to § 2-511(3),
although the text will include both.
"' Section 9-301(1)(6) of the Code states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2). an unperfected security in-
terest is subordinate to the rights of (b) a person who becomes a lien
creditor befOre the security interest is perfected.
42 Cases holding that the cash seller's reclamation right is a security interest
include In re Samuels & Co.. 526 F.2d 1238, 1245-48 (5th Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy
decision). A case holding that it is not a security interest is Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v.
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 175, 519 P.2d 354, 359 (1974).
":3 77 Comi. L. REV., Stipia note 2, at 958-59. This is true even when the seller
accepts a check as payment, since acceptance of it check (unless post-dated) does not
change a cash sale into a credit transaction. See NoRns -ruom, supra note 19, at 502-03;
U.C.C. § 2-511, Comment 6.
" 4 See 77 COLUNI. L. REv.. supra note 2, at 957-59.
"' Cf. Bank of Madison v. -Fri-County Livestock Auction Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Sery  5`i 55-56 (Ga. (.:1. App. 1971). In this case, the seller expressly reserved title by
reciting in its invoices: "Customers paying for livestock by check or draft agree that the
title does not pass until funds have actually been received. - The court held that this
constituted a security interest under § 2-401(1) and was subordinate to a perfected
security interest. See also General Electric Credit Corp. v. Tidwell Industries, Inc., 21
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1188, 1193 (Ariz. 1977). Bu! see In re Samuels & Co.. 526 F.2c1 1238,
1246-47 (5th Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy decision). In United States v. Wyoming Nat'l
Bank of Casper, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1 974), the court held that a cash seller
who took a "bad check" could not assert a security interest under § 2-507(2), but could
assert a security interest under § 2-401(1).
1 " See Dugan, supra note 2, at 343.
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found in Comment I to section 9-113, 14' 7
 does not include the seller's right to
reclaim goods under sections 2-507(2) or 2-511(3). The Article 2 security
interests—the seller's right to stop delivery of goods under sections 2-703 and
2-705, or resell the goods under sections 2-703 and 2-706; the buyer's security
interest in goods justifiably rejected under section 2-711; and the financing
agent's security interest in goods under section 2-506—differ fundamentally
from the cash seller's right to reclaim goods. The existence of the Article 2
security interests listed in this Comment depends on the seller's possession of
the goods; the existence of Ihe seller's right to reclaim goods, however, stems
from the seller's nonpossession of the goods. The cash seller's right of recla-
mation under sections 2-507(2) or 2-511(3) undoubtedly is not the sort of
right which section 9-113 regards as a security interest. 108
Finally, analogous support for the proposition that a cash seller's reclama-
tion right under sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) of the Code is not a security
interest exists in several courts' assertions that the credit seller's right of re-
clamation under section 2-702(2) of the Code is not an Article 2 security in-
terest.'" Since section 2-702(2), unlike sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3), con-
templates an extension of credit to the buyer, it presents a stronger case for a
court's characterizing it as a security interest. The refusal of several courts to
characterize the section 2-702(2) right as a security interest thus suggests that
they also would refuse to characterize the cash seller's right in section 2-507(2)
or 2-511(3) as a security interest.
For the reasons outlined above, we contend that the unpaid cash seller's
right to reclaim goods is not a security interest. Consequently, section
9-301(1)(b), which determines the priority between secured parties and lien
" 7
 In relevant part, this Comment states:
Linder the provisions of Article 2 on Sales, a seller of goods may re-
serve a security interest (see, e.g.. Sections 2-401 and 2-505); and in certain
circumstances, whether or not a security interest is reserved, the seller has
rights of resale anti stoppage under sections 2-703, 2-705 and 2-706 which
are similar to the rights of a secured party. Similarly, under such sections .
as sections 2-506, 2-707 ancf 2-711. a financing agency, an agent, a buyer
or another person may have a security interest. or other right in goods
similar to that of a seller. The use of the term "security interest" in the
Sales Article is meant to bring the interests so designated within this Arti-
cle. This section makes it clear, however, that such security interests are
exempted from certain provisions of this Article.
"8 If however, the seller's reclamation right under either 	 2-507(2) or
§ 2-511(3) is deemed a security interest, the definalting buyer arguably "does not lawfully
obtain possession of the goods" under § 9-113, particularly if the buyer has given the
seller a "bad check." If so, the seller's rights under its "security interest" are governed
solely by Article 2. See Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH.
L. REv. 1281, 1290 (1967); Wiseman, supra note 2, at 148-49; 77 CoLum. L. REV., supra
note 2, at 956-57.
"" See, e.g., In re Mel Guide Shoes, Inc,. 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968);
Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169
(Tex. Ct. App. 1975); In re American Food Purveyors, Inc., 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 436,
440 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge); English v. Ralph Williams Ford, 9
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creditors, is irrelevent to determination of priority between unpaid cash sellers
and lien creditors.
Likewise, the argument that section 2-702(3) subordinates the seller's
right. to reclaim under section 2-702(2) to the lien creditor's right to the goods
is irrelevant to resolution of the conflicting rights of the unpaid cash seller
and the attaching lien creditor. Nevertheless, some courts have cited section
2-702(3) as support for the proposition that a lien creditor's rights are
superior to those of an unpaid cash seller under section 2-507(2),"" the gen-
eral cash sale provision."' These courts generally argue that the unpaid cash
seller derives his right of reclamation from section 2-702(2), the ten-day re-
clamation provision. Therefore, they argue, section 2-702's limitations on the
right to reclaim, including subsection (3),I12 which subordinates the reclaiming
seller to the lien creditor, apply to the cash seller.'"
This argument, however, is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First,
it assumes that the cash seller's right to reclaim his goods stems from section
2-702(2). As we noted earlier,'" this assumption is incorrect; the cash seller's
right to reclaim is inherent in the two key cash sale provisions, sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3). Thus, there is no reason for a court to look to section
2-702. Second, if the cash seller's right to reclaim goods stems from section
2-511(3), the had check" provision, section 2-702(3)'s priority provision is in-
applicable because there is nothing to link the two sections. Case law bears out
this assertion; no decision has applied section 2-.702(3)'s priority rules to a
"bad check" case proceeding under section 2-511(3). Third, the view that sec-
tion 2-702(3) subordinates the cash seller to the lien creditor does not enjoy
unanimous support.. Several courts have held or suggested that the cash sell-
er's rights are superior to those of a lien creditor."' Finally, even if the
seller's right to reclaim goods originates in section 2-702(2), section 2-702(3)
does not always subordinate the rights of the cash seller to those of the lien
creditor. Approximately one-third of the states have adopted the Permanent
Editorial Board's amendment to section 2-702(3) lit which deletes the refer-
"" No decisions discuss the applicability of § 2-702(3) to cash sale cases that
stem from § 2-511(3)'s "bad check" provision. But see note 92 supra.
" I See In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Sere. 384, 387 (N.D. lnd.
1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In w Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 UGC. Rep. Scrv.
746, 749 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge). Cf. Greater Louisville Auto
Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 1965) (court would have
applied § 2-702(3) if third party had qualified as a lien creditor).
112 Section 2-702(3) provides:
The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of
a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor
under this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes
all other remedies with respect to them.
The 1972 amendments to the UCC deleted the words "or lien creditor" front the
language above. See text and notes 116-17 infra.
1 " See cases cited at note 111 supra.
" 4 See text and notes 65-72 supra.
"5 See In re Mort Co., 208 F. Stipp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re Linden-
baum's Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. 495, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (decision of bankruptcy
referee).
Ili	 1)
.r...tyowr No. 3 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL. BOA RD FOR THE UNIFORM
CommEttcw. Com, (U.C.C. Perin. Editorial Bd. 1967).
January 1979]	 THE GASH SELLER UNDER THE UCC
	 393
ence in this section to lien creditors.'" In states that have amended this
section, courts must.resort to other Code provisions or the common law to
resolve the priority issue)" At common law, as we have noted,' the cash
seller defeated the lien creditor. Even in jurisdictions that retain the reference
in section 2-702(3) to lien creditors, there is a possibility that a cash seller
would defeat a lien creditor. In these jurisdictions, there is a dispute as to
whether section 2-702(3) subordinates the seller to a lien creditor. The dom-
inant view apparently is that section 2-702(3) does not compel subordination
of the seller, and that recourse to common law rules is necessary.'" Thus,
even if section 2-702 is linked to section 2-507(2) (or even section 2-511(3))
and section 2-702(3) is viewed as the proper priority provision, many courts
probably would resort to common law rules. Thus, the cash seller would de-
feat the lien creditor.
For all the reasons which we have outlined above, it is clear that section
2-702(3) does not properly resolve the conflict between the reclaiming cash
seller's and the attaching lien creditor's right to the goods. We contend that.
section 2-403, rather than section 2-702(3), provides the best approach to the
"7 Sec U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1972 version).
" 5
 Most. likely, courts will recognize that the 1972 amendment. removes any
pretense of a resolution of' seller–versus–lien creditor priority issue and irnplicity ad-
vocates resort to common law for the solution.
"" Sec text and note 27 .cupra.
1 " Generally, these courts first note that § 2-702(3) states that the "seller's right
to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a ... lien creditor under this
Article (Section 2-403)." They argue that § 2-702(3) does not subordinate the seller to
a lien creditor, but, rather, to the lien creditor's rights as defined in § 2-403. Section
2-403(4) merely states that the lien creditor's rights are governed by Articles 6, 7, and
9 of the Code. Articles 6 and 7 are equally unenlightening; the only Article 9 provision
dealing with this matter, § 9-301(1)(b), slates that an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to a lien creditor. Since the cash seller's right of reclamation is not a sec-
urity interest, and since § 9-301 is otherwise uninstructive, these courts conclude that
the question is unresolved by the Code. Thus, they resort to common law priority rules
under which the defrauded credit seller prevails over the lien creditor. For cases es-
pousing views similar to that which we just. described, see In re PSA Farmers Market
Ass'n, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1176, 1180-87 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Federal's Inc., 553
F.2d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1977) (bankruptcy decision); In re Mel Go1de Shoes, Inc.,
403 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1968) (bankruptcy decision); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d
820, 822 (3t1 Cir. 1960) (bankruptcy decision); In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C.; Rep.
Serv. 938, 943-44 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Royalty Homes,
Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61, 64 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (decision of bankruptcy referee).
For cases taking the view that § 2-702(3) subordinates the reclaiming credit seller to
the lien creditor, see In re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387, 391-93
(S.D. Tex. 1968) (decision of bankruptcy referee); In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 600, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (decision of bankruptcy referee); In re Units,
Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46, 48-49 (D. Conn. 1965) (decision of bankruptcy referee);
In re Eastern Supply Co„ 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151, 153-54 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (decision of
bankruptcy judge), aff'd, 331 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964). Note that the view that we
advocate—recourse to common law priority rules—is supported by all of the c o urts of
appeals considering the issue. For a more detailed discussion of these questions, see
Mann & Phillips, In re Federal's, Inc., Another Hound in the Battle between the Reclaiming
Credit Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 46 FoRnitAm L. Rr.v. 641 (1978); Mann &
Phillips, supra note 1, at 620-24.
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problem of priorities between the cash seller and the lien creditor. Although
section 2-403 primarily establishes priority between cash sellers and good faith
purchasers for value, subsection (4) states: "The rights of ... lien creditors are
governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers
(Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7)." Articles (5 and 7, however, say
nothing about the rights of lien creditors. Article 9 is equally unenlightening;
the only possible reference to lien creditors in Article 9 is section 9-301(1)(b)'s
statement that a lien creditor has priority over an unperfected security in-
terest. But, as we demonstrated earlier, the cash seller's reclamation right is
not a security interest ,121 so section 9-301(1)(b) is inapplicable. The Code
alone, therefore, does not solve the priority problem. However, section
1-103 122 permits courts to look to the common law where, as here, the Code
has not displaced prior law. There is no doubt that under the common law,
the unpaid cash seller prevails over the lien creditor.' 23 Thus, section 2-403
indirectly resolves the conflict between the rights of the reclaiming cash seller
and the attaching lien creditor 124
Section 2-403's solution has several distinct advantages over the other sol-
utions provided by current case law. First, it produces certain and uniform
results. Our research has uncovered no common law cases in which the lien
creditor defeated an unpaid cash seller who had not. waived his rights.'" Sec-
ond, if sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) embody the common law cash sale doc-
trine, as we believe they do, section 2-403 resolves the priority problem in a
way that is consistent. with the common law doctrines, and thus provides his-
torical continuity as well.
4. Summary
-1-o summarize our views about the proper resolution of' the conflict be-
tween the unpaid cash seller's right to reclaim his goods and third parties'
rights, we reiterate that section 2-403 of the Code should govern all priority
problems. As numerous courts have recognized, section 2-403(1) expressly re-
solves the conflict between the good faith purchaser's and the unpaid cash
seller's right. to the goods by subordinating the cash seller to the good faith
purchaser. Section 2-403(1) also resolves the conflict. between the holder of an
Article 9 security interest. and the unpaid cash seller because most Article 9
secured parties ' 2 " qualify as good faith purchasers for value and, as such, fit
12 ' Sec text. aml notes 100-02 supra.
` 2 Section 1-103 provides in pertinent part: "Unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provi-
sions. -
123 Sec text. and note 27 supra.
124 Ste cases cited in note 1 20  supra.
"5 Bill see Dugan, note 2 supra, at 367-68. Professor Dugan suggests that it. is
not unlikely- that the lien creditor would defeat the cash seller at common law. How-
ever, he cites no authority for either proposition.
12" Secured parties who assert a security interest in the goods by virtue of an
after-acquired property clause may or 'nay not qualify as good faith purchasers for
value. See text and -note 85 sup's'.
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squarely within the rules of section 2-403(1). Thus, under this section, the
Article 9 secured party's right to the goods is superior to that of the unpaid
cash seller. Moreover, section 2-403(4) circuitously establishes priority between
the lien creditor and the cash seller by referring one first to Articles 6, 7, and
9 of the Code and then, because of those Articles' failure to resolve the prob-
lem, to section 1-103 and the common law priority rules. As a result, the
unpaid cash seller assumes priority over the lien creditor.
III. THE CASH SELLER AND THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY 127
Good faith purchasers, secured parties, and lien creditors are not the only
third parties that the unpaid cash seller must face in his struggle to reclaim
his goods. A seller attempting to reclaim goods may find that the buyer is
insolvent and that a trustee in bankruptcy has taken charge of the buyer's
assets. The trustee can employ several sections of the Bankruptcy Act (Act) 128
to oppose the seller's attempt to reclaim the goods. These sections include
section 70(c), which gives the trustee the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor;
section 67(c), which invalidates certain statutory liens; section 60, which voids
certain preferential transfers made by the debtor; and section 70(e), which
annuls fraudulent or voidable transfers. This section of our article discusses
the effect of these sections of the Bankruptcy Act upon the reclaiming cash
seller.
A. Section 70(c)
One of the most commonly used weapons in the trustee's arsenal is sec-
tion 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act."" Section 70(c), the so-called "strong arm"
provision, states in relevant part:
The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and
powers of ... a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained
a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all property ... upon
which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract could have
obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.'"
Section 70(c), as one court has noted, transforms the trustee into an "ideal
creditor ... armed cap-a-pie with every right and power which is conferred
by the law of the state upon its most favored creditor who has acquired a lien
L27 Editor's Note: On November 6, 1978, after the completion of this article,
Congress thoroughly revised the existing bankruptcy law in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter cited as Reform Act). This
Reform Act will take effect on October 1, 1979. Id. § 402, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). Be-
cause the Reform Act affects only a portion of this article, we will briefly explain a few
of the Reform Acts more important implications for this article at the article's conclu-
sion. At this point, we wish only to say that, based on a preliminary examination of the
Reform Act and its legislative history, we believe that most of this article's discussion of
the cash seller's right to reclaim when the buyer enters bankruptcy is still relevant.
128
 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et .seq. (1976).
' 29 Id.	 110(c).
13,, Id.
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by legal or equitable proceedings."'" For the transformation to occur, this
creditor need not exist; 132 the trustee must merely hypothesize a creditor en-
titled to priority over existing bankruptcy claimants under the law of the
forum state. However, the trustee is deemed to be an "ideal creditor" only
"upon the date of bankruptcy"; in other words, the trustee cannot pick a
more advantageous, earlier time on which to acquire the hypothetical lien.'"
Having been characterized as the holder of a lien, the trustee can defeat
the unpaid cash seller and recover the goods for the bankrupt's estate only if
the hypothetical lien creditor could do so under state law. Some courts in such
cases have held for the cash seller; " 4 others, for the lien creditor." 5 We
contend, as we did earlier, that the cash seller should prevail over the lien
creditor and, thus, over the trustee in bankruptcy proceeding under section
70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.""
B. Section 67(c)
Another of the trustee's weapons is section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act."' A closely related section of the Act, section 67(b),138 validates a broad
range of statutory liens against the trustee. However, section 67(c) carves out
many exceptions to section 67(b) by stating "every statutory lien which is not
perfected or enforceable at the date of bankruptcy against one acquiring the
rights of it bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that date, whether or not
'" In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932) (discussing
predecessor of § 70(c)).
' 32 See 4A CoLL ► Ett oN BANKitu ► TcY 11 70.50, at 609-14 (14th ed. 1976). Bul see
Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1962).
' 3 ' See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961), where the
Court stated:
[1]1 we construe § 70(c) as petitioner does, there would be no period of
repose. Security transactions entered into in good faith years before the
bankruptcy could be upset if the trustee were ingenious enough to conjure
up a hypothetical situation in which a hypothetical creditor might have had
such a right.
See also In re Federal's, Inc.. 533 F.2d 509, 512-14 (6th Cir. 1977).
sa In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re Linden-
haunt's Inc.. 2 U.C.C. Rep. SCAT. 495, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (decision of bankruptcy
referee). See also In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Stipp. 840. 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968)
(the actual Bankruptcy Act section at issue is uncertain, but the court seems willing to
find for the seller in an appropriate case).
137' See In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (N.D. Ind.
1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); in re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
746, 749 (M.D. Ca. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
At least one court has held that an unpaid cash seller's right to reclaim goods
was an "unperfected security interest" which was subordinate to the rights of a lien
creditor under 9-301(1)(6). This court concluded, therefore, that the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. qua hypothetical lien creditor, prevailed over the cash seller. In re Samuels &
Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir. 1976).
in See Dugan, supra note 2, at 367-68, for a brief suggestion contrary to this
conclusion.
' 37 I I U.S.C. § 107(c) (1976).
1,1. § 107(b).
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such a purchaser exists," is invalid against the trustee.' 39 In other words, the
trustee in bankruptcy steps into the shoes of a hypothetical bona fide pur-
chaser of the goods from the buyer. It' the hypothetical purchaser has priority
over the holder of a statutory lien on the goods, the trustee also has priority
over the lienor.
Section 67(c) has serious implications for the cash seller. If the unpaid
cash seller's right to reclaim his goods is characterized as a statutory lien, the
cash seller loses his right to reclaim the goods when the trustee enters the
picture. Since, under section 2-403(1) of the Code, the unpaid cash seller's
right to the goods is inferior to that of the good faith purchaser,'" the cash
seller's right to the goods is also inferior to that of the trustee. There has been
no litigation over whether the cash seller's right of reclamation inherent in
sections 2-507(2) and 2-51 1(3) of the Code is a statutory lien. However, sev-
eral courts have held that section 2-702(2) of the Code, which allows the cre-
dit seller to reclaim goods within ten (lays, creates a statutory lien which is
invalidated by section 67(c) of the Act."'
Since the cash seller's reclamation right inherent in sections 2-507(2) and
2-511(3) of the Code is similar to the credit seller's right in section 2-702(2), it.
is instructive to examine the courts' rationale for characterizing, or for refus-
ing to characterize, the right in section 2-702(2) as a statutory lien. The start-
ing point for the courts' consideration of this problem is section 1(29a) of the
Bankruptcy Act,' 42 which defines a statutory lien as "a lien arising solely by
force of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions." ' 4 " Sections
2-507(2), 2-511(3), and 2-702(2) plainly qualify as "statutes." However, the de-
finition speaks of a lien "arising solely by force of statute."144 Some courts,
noting section 2-702(2)'s close relationship with the common law remedy of
rescission for fraud, argue that section 2-702(2) is not "solely statutory" be-
13" Id § 107(c)(1)(11).
"" See text and notes 79-82 supra.
"` In re Neisner Bros., Inc.. 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv, 157, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y, 1978)
(decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Kee LOX Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 938,
942-43 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Perskey & Wolf, Inc., 19
U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. 812, 814-17 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (decision of bankruptcy referee); In re
Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's Corp., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re
Good Deal Supermarkets, inc., 384 F. Stipp. 887, 889 (D.N.J. 1974). See also In re J. R.
Nieves & Co„ 446 F.2d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 1971); In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 623
(W.D. La.), air 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968) (Trahan and Nieves deal with interpreta-
timis of civil codes).
It is interesting to note, however, that all the United States Courts of Appeals
that have considered this question have held that § 2-702(2) of the Code does nol
create a statutory lien. In re PFA Farmers Market Ass'n, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. 1176,
1187-92 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509. 516-17 (6th Cir. 1977); In
re Telernart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1975). See also In re Na-
tional Rellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Sm. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bank-
ruptcy judge).
"2 11 U.S.C, § I (29a) (1976).
143 hire
'" 1(1. (emphasis added).
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cause it is simply a codification of the common law. 145 Other courts contend
that the differences between section 2-702(2) and its common law counter-
parts justify characterizing section 2-702(2) as "solely statutory" within the def-
inition of section 1(29a). 14 "
Without discussing the tedious and unanswerable question whether the
cash sale provisions of sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) are closer to their com-
mon law counterparts than section 2-702(2) is to its forebears, we can say
confidently that sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3), as the courts interpret them,
are closely related to the common law of cash sales. 147 As with section
2-702(2), however, this relationship does not provide a clear answer to the
question whether the cash seller's right. to reclaim his goods constitutes a
statutory lien for purposes of section 67(c). While some courts will find that
the seller's right of reclamation inherent. in sections 2-507(2) and 2-51 1(3) is
not "solely statutory," other courts may characterize the right as "solely statu-
tory."
In deciding whether to characterize the cash seller's right in sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3) as a statutory lien within the purview of section 67(c) of
the Act, courts also must determine whether the right is a "lien." The Bank-
ruptcy Act does not define the term "lien." Many courts, however, define it as
a hold or claim on property lOr the payment of some debt, obligation, or
duty.' 48 Again, it is helpful to look at cases in which courts discuss whether
the right in section 2-702(2) constitutes a "lien." Sonic courts have held that.
section 2-702(2) is not a "lien" because lien holders typically can repossess and
sell the encumbered property and also recover any remaining debt from the
debtor, whereas the reclaiming seller under section 2-702(2) can only recover
and sell the goods. 14" These courts base their conclusion on section 2-702(3)'s
statement that "rshiccessful reclamation of goods exlcudes all other remedies
with respect to them." Other courts have held that section 2-702(2) does
145 See In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977):
We 11111St agree with the district court's observation that § 2-702 is more
than a mere codification of the common law. Nevertheless, we are per-
suaded that the right asserted by the seller under § 2-702(2) is a valid
state-created right of ownership. Because that right conceptually has its an-
tecedents in the historical and equitable right of a defrauded seller to re-
claim the goods he has sold to an insolvent buyer, we hold it cannot be said
to arise "solely by force of statute" under § 1(29).
Id. at 516 (emphasis added). See also In re National BeIlas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
14 " See In re Giltex, laic., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 889-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In
re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bank-
ruptcy judge).
' 47 Sec text and notes 34-50 supra.
1 " See, e.g., 51 Am. Auk. 2d Liens § 1, at 142-43 (1970); BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1072-73 (rev'd 4th ed. 1968). For a compendium of definitions of this term, sec
53 N.C. L. REv. 169, 172-73 (1974).
145 See In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. 430, 432-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
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create a "lien" because the reclamation right, like a lien, terminates upon
payment of the debt.' 5 "
This case law, like that involving the definition of "solely statutory," does
not answer clearly the question whether the reclamation right inherent in sec-
tions 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) constitutes a "lien." Obviously, this reclamation
right. fits within the general definition of a "lien." However, the seller's com-
mon law right of reclamation, from which the right in sections 2-507(2) and
2-511(3) stem, was not considered a "lien."'" Moreover, the argument that
the reclamation right in section 2-702(2) is not a lien because it is limited to
recovery of the goods is equally applicable to the right in sections 2-507(2)
and 2-511(3). Finally, some courts might characterize this reclamation right as
a "lien" because it terminates upon payment. We believe this characterization
would be improper, though, since the same argument would apply equally to
most of the unpaid cash seller's remedies, few of which are "liens."' i 2 Thus,
we believe courts should not deem the seller's right of reclamation under sec-
tions 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) a "lien."
The inevitable, though unsatisfying, conclusion is that it is unclear
whether the seller's right of reclamation under sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
is a voidable statutory lien. We contend, however, that the cash seller's right
of reclamation inherent in these sections is not a "lien" and does not arise
"solely by force of statute," and, therefore, does not fit the Act's definition of
a statutory lien. The legislative history of section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act
supports this conclusion.'" Our contention is critical since it is clear that if
"" See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In
re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of
bankruptcy judge).
15 ' The common law clearly distinguished between the seller's right to reclaim
goods for which the buyer had not paid, and interests such as that of the conditional
seller. Common law designated the latter as a lien, hut. it did not characterize the
former in this fashion. See text and notes 7-9 supra.
152 See U.C.C. § 2-703. This section makes the listed seller's remedies dependent
upon (among other things) the buyer's failure "to make a payment due on or before
delivery." Presumably, the seller's action for the price, at least, would terminate upon
payment of the price. And it is not obvious how this remedy could be regarded as a
"lien," since it does not seem to involve any sort of hold or claim on the goods sold. See
2-709.
153
 At one time, the Bankruptcy Act preserved state-created priorities, thus giv-
ing the states substantial power to determine which creditors' claims had priority over
which other creditors' claims. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 563. In 1938,
Congress amended the Act, taking this power away from the stales. Act of June 22,
1938, ch. 575, § 64. 52 Stat.. 874. Some states subsequently recast what once were
state-created priorities in the form of liens in an attempt to salvage some of their lost
power. See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Congress,
in turn, reacted by amending § 67 of' the Act to invalidate many of these statutory
liens. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. I_ No. 89-495, §§ 3-4, 80 Stat. 268-69 (as codified in 11
U.S.C. §§ I07(c)(1)(A),(13),(C) (197(1). The general recognition of statutory liens in
bankruptcy was retained in the new § 67(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 107(h) (1976).
Some courts have concluded on the basis of this legislative history that section
2-702(2) is one of the statutory liens at which § 67(c)(I)(A) is aimed. In re Giltex, Inc..
17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 423, 427-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Good Deal Supermarkets Inc., 384 F.
400	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:370
the cash seller's right of reclamation is denominated a statutory lien, the seller
loses his right to reclaim the goods to the trustee in bankruptcy armed with
section 67(c) of the Act.'"
Supp. 887, 889 (D.N.J. 1974). Those courts presumably would conclude, for the same
reasons, that ** 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) are statutory liens at which § 67(c)(1)(B) of the
Act is aimed. Not all courts have adopted this reasoning, however. In fact, the three
United States Courts of Appeals that have considered this question rejected this
reasoning. See In re PEA Farmers Market Ass'n, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1176, 1192 (8th
Cir. 1978); In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1977); In re. Telemart
Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2c1 761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1975).
In addition, the cash seller's reclamation right is not one of the evils at which
the 1966 amendment of § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act is directed. The common law
analogues of § 2-507(2), § 2-511(3), and § 2-702(2) pre-date the developments which
this amendment addressed. Cl In re Telcmart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 764
(9th Cir. 1975). Furthermore, the legislative history of this amendment, at least the
Senate Report accompanying the legislation, does not refer to § 2-507(2), § 2-511(3), or
*2-702(2). See S. REP. No. 1159, 8thli Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) and S. NEI ,. No. 999, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 11966] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. News 2442-68. In the
context of § 2-702(2), see In re Federal's Inc.. 553 F.2d 509, 516-17 (6th Cit.. 1977),
where the court stated:
We conclude that the right of reclamation tinder § 2-702(2) is not the
kind of lien which Congress intended to invalidate by § 67(c)(1)(A). We
note the total lack of reference to § 2-702 in the legislative history of the
1966 amendments. So extensive a provision of state law would hardly es-
cape notice if it were one of the legitimate targets of the amendment. We
attribute this absence of reference not to oversight, but to the more likely
explanation that the Congress viewed the Code provision as did its authors:
a basic updating of the equitable remedies of rescission.
Finally, the Senate Report of the Amendment states that it aims in part at
"liens creating a noncontingent property interest in a specific asset." S. REP. No. 999,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2457. Although
a cash seller's reclamation right under § 2-507(2) and * 2-511(3) is clearly an interest
"in a specific asset," it is "contingent" upon factors such as the buyer's failure to pay,
the seller's compliance with the ten-day limitation (if it exists), and so forth.
"4 In three recent cases, courts invalidated the seller's right of reclamation as a
statutory lien under § 67(c)(I)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act, but nevertheless permitted
the seller to employ whatever pre-Code remedies he had. In re Neisner Bros., Inc., 25
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re
Wesson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); he re Gihex, Inc., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge). The
courts permitted the seller to resort to common law relief despite language in
§ 2-702(2) which provided: "Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not
base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent. misrepresentation
of solvency or of intent to pay." One court avoided this exclusionary language by
arguing:
Equitable consideratons require that I reject the argument that since
§ 2-702 is by its final sentence, made an exclusive remedy, once it is invali-
dated by § 67(c)(1)(A), the seller is left withot a remedy. I find the
argument specious and the notion abhorrent to a court of equity. Surely
§ 2-702 must be read together and the last sentence of subsection (2) must be
taken to mean that § 2-702 is the exclusive remedy if it survives attack by
the trustee, and if invalidated by § 67(c)(1)(A) the seller is not to be dep-
rived of any pre-Code remedy he may have had.
In re Weston's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bank-
ruptcy judge). In In re GIhex, Inc., the court followed the reasoning in Irr re kVeston's
Corp. In re Gillex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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C. Section 60
The trustee in bankruptcy's ability to recover goods for the benefit of the
bankrupt's estate is not dependent on his securing the goods before the cred-
itor can do so. Under section 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act,' 55 the trustee can
claim an 'unpaid cash seller's goods even though the seller has repossessed
them before the date of bankruptcy.'" Section 60(a)(1)''" defines voidable
pre-bankruptcy transfers, which are called "preferences," as:
a transfer ... of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit
of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suf-
fered by such debtor while insolvent and within tour months before
the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding
under this title, the effect. of which transfer will he to enable such
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than sonic other
creditor of the same class.'"
Under section 60(b) of the Act, the trustee can avoid a preference "if the
creditor receiving it or to be benefitted thereby ... has, al. the time when the
transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." 1"
Although there are no cases in which a trustee has proceeded under sec-
tion 60 against a cash seller who has reclaimed his goods,'" such a case is
The effect of these cases on other Bankruptcy Act provisions in unclear since
they deal only with § 67(c) of the Act. The effect of these cases on sections of the UCC
other than § 2-702(2) is also unclear. However, there is no apparent reason not. to
extend the reasoning in these cases to §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3), and not to allow cash
sellers to utilize p•e-Code remedies if their Code reclamation rights are invalidated.
There is no exclusivity provision in § 2-507(2) or § 2-511(3). Moreover, § 1-103 should
preserve the seller's pre-Code remedies.
155
 II U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976).
' 5 " In fact, the seller might be deemed to have retaken the goods by merely
demanding them. Cf. In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1971)
(determining whether a transfer was in violation of § 70(d)).
' 5 ' 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976).
I rim id
' 5 " Id. § 96(b). If the unpaid cash seller's right of reclamation is regarded as a
preference under § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the cash seller might argue that the
trustee cannot void the preference under § 60(b) because the seller did not. have
"reasonable cause to believe" that the buyer was insolvent. For cases concerning
whether the seller's reclamation of the goods evidences belief in the buyer's insolvency,
see, e.g.. Brown v. Tru-Lite, Inc., 398 F. Stipp. 800, 804-05 (W.I). La. 1975) (seizure of
goods by itself does not necessarily create finding of reasonable cause or a duty to
investigate; each case must be considered on own facts); liossak & Co. v. Cole, 285 F.
147, 148-49 (5th Cir, 1922) (recovery of goods then worth 50% of their sale price
sufficient to establish reasonable cause). For views on whether a bad check creates a
reasonable belief in the buyer's insolvency, see, e.g., C.A. Swanson & Sons Poultry Co.
v. Wylie, 237 F.2d 16, 18 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1956) (NSF check one factor among many to
be considered); Dinkelspiel v. Weaver, 116 F. Stipp. 455, 462 (W.D. Ark. 1953) (NSF
check not conclusive; must. consider other circumstances): Robic v. Myers Equipment
Co., 114 F. Stipp. 177. 182 (D. Minn. 1953) (dishonored check plus subsequent offer
of postdated check enough to create finding of reasonable cause); Couriers v.
Bucksport Nat'l Bank, 214 F. 847, 849-50 (D. Maine), red, 216 F. 990 (1st. Cir. 1914)
(had check plus other inf ormation enough for finding of reasonable cause).
'"" Two cases mentioning cash sellers reclaiming their goods under § 2-507(2)
or § 2-511(3) are In re COlaCCi . S of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1974)
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possible.'" We submit., however:, that if such a case arises, the cash seller
should prevail over the trustee for a number of reasons. First, the seller is not
(decided under § 60(a) of the' Bankruptcy Act.) and In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F.
Supp. 840, 844-46 (W.D. Va. 1968) (which is not clearly a § 60 case). However, neither
addressed the clash between § 60 and U.C.C. § 2-507(2) and § 2-155(3). Cf. Dugan,
supra note 2, at 369-70.
"'' Our research also has not disclosed any common law cash sale cases in which
the trustee challenged the cash seller under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. This lack of
cases probably stems from the common law view of title in cash sales. In a cash sale at
common law, tire buyer obtained title to the goods only upon payment; if the buyer
(lid not pay for the goods, he did not take title. Therefore, the goods that an unpaid
cash seller reclaimed were not the "property of the debtor." Thus, under § 60(a)'s .
definition, the reclamation was not. a voidable preference and § 60(b) was inapphcable.
See 4A Cowcx„supra note 211, 60.07, at 791, 11 70.19 [5], at 242-44. Similarly, in
consignment and bailment cases, the repossessing party triumphed over the trustee,
usually on the grounds that the bankrupt never had title to the goods. See Kemp-
Booth Co. v. Calvin, 84 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1936); Iu re Wright-Dana Hardware
Co.. 205 F. 335, 336 (N.D.N.Y. 1913), aff'd, 211 F. 908 (2c1 Cir. 1914). The reposses-
sing seller also defeated the trustee in cases where the bankrupt fraudulently obtained
the goods. See, e.g., Fisher v. Shreve, Crump & Lowe Co., 7 F.2(1 159, 161 (D. Mass.
1925). However, in cases involving credit where the buyer did not defraud the seller,
the trustee won under § 60. Set' Marks v. Goodyear Rubber Sundries. Inc., 238 F.2d
533, 534 (2c1 Cir. 1956); Plummer v. Myers, 137 F. 660. 662 (E.D. Pa. 1905).
Despite the inapplicability of 60(h) to common law cases involving reclaiming
cash sellers, it is possible that § 60(b) is relevant to Code cases involving cash sellers.
The Code deemphasizes the concept of title, U.C.C. § 2-401, thus muddying the issue
or whether the buyer or the unpaid seller has title to the goods. However, the Code
may reverse the common law result. Comment 1 to § 2-401 states:
This section ... in no way intends «) indicate which line of interpreta-
tion should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regula-
tion depends upon location of "title" without further definition. The
basic policy of this Article that known purpose and reason should govern
interpretation cannot extend beyond the scope of its own provisions. It is
therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under
this Article in case the courts deem any public regulation to incorporate
the defined term of the "private" law.
Thus, if the Bankruptcy Act is regarded as such a "public regulation," the "title" provi-
sions of §§ 2-41)1(1)-(3) may apply. The relevant. title provision scents u.t be § 2-401(2)
which states that "[ti]tless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with respect to the physi-
cal delivery of the goods." Thus, in a typical cash sale, the buyer obtains title to the
goods as soon as the seller delivers them. Therefore, the goods would be the "property
of the debtor" under § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
The issue of whether the buyer or the seller has title to goods for which the
buyer has nut paid is also important in the context of § 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976). Section 64(a), another possible tool of the trustee, establishes
priorities among classes of creditors. In 1938, Congress amended § 64(a) to eliminate
the advantage accorded to state-created priorities. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541,
§ 64, 30 Stat. 653, as amended b Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575. § 64, 52 Stat. 874.
Sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) may be classified as invalid, state-created priorities be-
cause they allow a cash seller to recover goods after the buyer goes into bankruptcy.
Indeed, some courts have reasoned similarly in cases involving the reclamation of
goods under § 2-702. They hold that § 2-702(2) is an invalid, state-created priority. See
In re Neisners Bros., inc., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 157, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (decision
of bankruptcy judge); In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich.
_January 19791
	
THE CASH SELLER UNDER THE UGC	 403
a "creditor" within the meaning of section 1(11) of the Act. 1 " 2
 The Act de-
fines "creditors" as "anyone who owns a debt, demand or claim provable in
bankruptcy." " 3
 The unpaid cash seller superficially appears to qualify as a
creditor, but there is considerable authority to the effect that an individual
whose property has been stolen, misappropriated, converted, or fraudulently
obtained is not a "creditor" if he stands on his rights as owner, demands
return of the goods, and does not treat the possessor of the goods as a debtor
(for example, by demanding payment rather than possession)."'' Although
most of these cases involved fraudulent conduct by the bankrupt, there is no
reason to treat the unpaid cash seller differently, especially since the de-
frauded seller's and the unpaid cash seller's interests in the goods are very
similar at common law and under the Code. Moreover, many "bad check"
transactions involve franc!.'"' Thus, the unpaid cash seller should not he
considered a "creditor" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
Second, the unpaid cash seller's repossession of the goods is not a trans-
fer "for or on account of the antecedent debt" for purposes of section 60(a).
Courts regard the buyer's payment of the purchase price and the cash seller's
delivery of the goods as substantially simultaneous,'" and, thus, as not "for or
on account of the antecedent debt."'" However, it is often said that any ex-
tension of credit, no matter how brief, can change a cash sale into a credit sale
and render any transfer by the buyer to the seller preferential.' 6 8 Thus , if a
buyer exchanges a "bad check" for the goods and a cash seller later retakes
the goods, the question arises whether this retaking is a transfer "on account
of an antecedent. debt." We submit that the debt and cash seller's correspond-
ing right to reclaim arises when the check is not paid, and that the seller's
subsequent repossession of the goods relates back to the time the right of
reclamation arose. Therefore, the right to reclaim is not "on account of an
1973) (decision of bankruptcy referee), aff'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975); In
re Perskey & Wolf, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 812 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (decision of bank-
ruptcy referee). However, In re Federal's, Inc. has been expressly overruled, 553 F.2d
509 (6th Cir. 1977). In re Pcrskcy & Wolf, Inc. also has been impliedly overruled by
the Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Federal's Inc. The validity of this argument is
therefore questionable. See In re PEA Farmers Market Ass'n, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1176, 1187-92 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 517-18 (6th Cir.
1977); In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2c1 761, 764-66 (9th Cir. 1975). Since
there is no reason to treat differently the right of reclamation in § 2-507(2) or
§ 2-511(3) and that in § 2-702(2), it is unlikely that a court would consider the cash
seller's right of reclamation to be invalid, state-created priority.
'"2 11 U.S.C. § 1(1 ) (1976).
3 id.
154 3 COLLIER, supra note 132, 11 60.18.
1 " This is not, however, to suggest that the pre-Code cash sale reclamation
right and the defrauded seller's rescission right were exactly the same, or, similarly,
that the cash seller's right under § 2-507(2) and § 2-511(3), and the credit seller's
rights under § 2-702(2) are equivalent. We simply believe that there is no compelling
reason to treat the situations differently for purposes of § 60 of the Act.
" See text at note 38 supra.
"" See 3 COLLIER, Sltpra note 132, ¶ 60.19, at 847-49; ¶ 60.23, at 872-73.
1 " See, e.g., In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Stipp. 840, 843 (W.D. Va. 1968).
The seller arguably retakes the goods to satisfy the buyer's preexisting obligation to
pay for the goods.
404	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 20:370
antecedent debt." 169 Unless the seller's repossession of the goods is regarded
as relating back to the time the debt arose, the repossession always will consti-
tute a transfer "for or on account of an antecedent debt" because a seller
obviously cannot reclaim his goods at the exact moment the check is dishon-
ored.' 7 " Moreover, unless the repossession is regarded as not "for or on ac-
count. of an antecedent debt, " the cash seller is put in the same position in
bankruptcy as the credit seller. Therefore, assuming that the cash seller re-
possesses his goods within a reasonable time, the brief lapse between the non-
payment of the check, or creation of the debt, and the reclamation is insig-
nificant.
Although, in our opinion, the unpaid cash seller's reclamation of his
goods clearly is not a voidable preference within the meaning of section 60(b),
the courts have not yet resolved the issue. Consequently, the unpaid cash sell-
er's best strategy is not to reclaim his goods before bankruptcy but, rather, to
file a bankruptcy reclamation petition and force the trustee to counter the
petition with the less advantageous sections of the Act.' 71
D. Section 70(e)
Finally, the trustee in bankruptcy may resort to section 70(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act 12 which provides:
A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor ad-
judged a bankrupt under this title which, under any Federal or State
law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against. or voidable for any
other reason by any creditor of the debtor, having' a claim provable
169 cf. In re Telcmart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2(1 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1975) (in-
volving § 2-702(2) of the Code):
[U]nder section 2-702(2) receipt of goods on credit while insolvent is
deemed a fraud on the creditor rendering the sale voidable. The sale thus
is defective from its inception. Clearly no new security has been given for
an antecedent debt; the "lien," if it is conceived as such, attached at the
instant the debt was created. Because no transfer is made on account of an
antecedent debt, section 60 could never be applicable.
The above reasoning is equally applicable to a situation involving § 2-5{)7(2) or
§ 2-511(3), where the event creating the "debt" (the buyer's failure to pay) also spawns
the buyer's right of reclamation.
1° If this argument seems extreme, consider the over-the-counter cash sale
where the seller conveys the goods to the buyer on "cash" terms in expectation of
immediate payment, the buyer does not pay, and the seller immediately retakes the
goods. It is absurd to view the lapse of time between the creation of the "debt" (assum-
ing that this time can be exactly specified) and the repossession as evidence that the
repossession was "for or on account of an antecedent debt" and, thus, preferential. It.
is equally absurd to differentiate between over-the-counter cash sales and cash sales in
which the seller transfers possession in exchange for a bad check and acts to repossess
immediately upon notification that the check has not been paid.
'" This advice seems rather anomalous since the seller who acts less promptly
would be more successful than the seller who acts quickly. But, the seller perhaps can
turn this anomaly to his advantage by arguing that his rights should be no less when
he acts promptly than when he acts belatedly.
12
 11 U.S.C. § 110(3) (1976).
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under this title, shall be null and void as against the trustee of such
debtor.'"
Section 70(e) permits the trustee to step into the shoes of any existing creditor
of the bankrupt.' 74 If this creditor has a claim to certain assets which is
superior to the claim of any other creditor—including a reclaiming cash
seller—the trustee can claim those goods. The trustee's power under section
70(e) is uncharacteristically restricted in one sense: unlike his power under
sections 70(c) and 67(c), it exists only if an actual creditor with a superior
claim to the goods exists.' '75 In one respect, however, the trustee's power also
is uncharacteristically broad. Under the much criticized'''' doctrine of Moore
v. Bay,'" the trustee qua creditor can displace the entire claim of another
claimant even if the creditor into whose shoes he stepped could displace only
a portion of it,' 78
Thus, section 70(e) may present a dire threat. to the reclaiming cash sell-
er. Since the cash seller's right of reclamation is inferior to the rights of an
Article 9 secured party' ' 7 " and, in some jurisdictions, a lien creditor,'" the
' 73 Id.	 10(e)(1).
Like § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, § 70(e) enables the trustee to invalidate
transfers made by the debtor prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. In fact,
§ 70(e) seems to apply only if the seller reclaims his goods before bankruptcy.
175 See 4A COLLIER, supra note 132 II 70.90[1], at 1029-30. Since in all likelihood
a lien creditor's rights arc not superior to those of a reclaiming Code cash seller, only
the presence of a creditor with an Article 9 security interest would . help the trustee to
defeat the cash seller under § 70(e) of the Act.
' 7 " See MCLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 330-33 (1965); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Micn. L. REV. 1419,
1421 (1967). Professor Kennedy notes that the result in Moore "contravenes a funda-
mental attribute of subrogation—that the person subrogated acquires no greater rights
than those of the person to whose position he is subrogated. - Id.
'" 284 U.S. 4 (1931),
17 H Thus, if the secured creditor had a claim of only $100, the trustee could
totally avoid a seller's right of reclamation even though the goods were worth $10,000.
' 7 " See 4A COLLIER, .supra note 132, 70.90, at 1034-35. Professor Kennedy
argues strenuously that the trustee in bankruptcy should not be allowed to step into
the shoes of a holder of a perfected security interest unless the trustee himself could
avoid the secured party's claim. Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Mien. L. REV. 1419, 1428-34 (1967). The courts
have not yet resolved this issue, however. WHITE & SHMMERS„MpEa note 29 at 891.
Professor Kennedy's argument, if accepted by a court, would assist the reclaim-
ing seller since the trustee usually cannot avoid the security interest and, therefore,
could not use the security interest to displace the cash seller's right. If, however, the
Article 9 security interest is unperfected, the trustee can displace it and use it against
the cash seller, thereby defeating the reclaiming cash seller.
1 " In these jurisdictions, § 67(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(1)
(1976), could prove useful. See Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer,
65 Micit. KA•. 1281, 1292 (1967). Section 67(a)(1) grants the trustee the right to
avoid liens obtained by attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable process
or proceeding within four months before the filing of petition in bankruptcy, if at the
time the lienor obtained the lien the person against whom it was obtained was insol-
vent. If subsequent to a cash seller's delivery of the goods, a 'creditor of an insolvent
buyer obtains a judicial lien against the buyer within four months of bankruptcy, the
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reclaiming seller may be vulnerable to the trustee's attack when either of these
parties has a claim to the same goods.'"'
E. Stimmao,
Although the rights of the unpaid cash seller when the buyer goes into
bankruptcy are far from settled, we can draw some conclusions. Section 70(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act, the hypothetical lien creditor provision, poses no
threat to the cash seller if, as we contend, the cash seller's reclamation right is
superior to the rights of a lien creditor. Section 67(c) of the Act is similarly
harmless since the cash seller's right of reclamation is not a "statutory lien"
invalidated by that. section, Furthermore, section 60(b) of the Act, which av-
oids "preferential transfers" made within four months of bankruptcy, is in-
applicable to the cash seller since the seller is not a "creditor" and does not
reclaim the goods for or on account of an antecedent debt" and, therefore,
has not made a preferential transfer. One real threat to the cash seller does
exist, however. Under section 70(e) of the Act, the trustee can defeat the cash
seller's right. to reclaim goods if any other creditor of the buyer could defeat
all or part of the cash seller's claim. Thus, although the unpaid seller's right.
to reclaim his goods is fairly secure even in bankruptcy, it is not invincible.
Postscript: As stated in note 127, the wholesale changes in federal bankruptcy
law effected by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 182 necessitate some discussion of its
impact on this article. Most of the article, however, remains relevant under the Reform
Act. Moreover, the Reform Act strengthens our basic contention that the cash seller
should defeat the trustee in bankruptcy.
For purposes if this article, the most important provision in the Reform Act is
section 546(c). 18 " Under this section, the trustee's right (via sections 60, 67(c), and
70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act) to goods sold to the bankrupt are "subject to any statutory
right or common law right of a seller, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, to
reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such goods while insolvent," and if the
seller makes a written demand for the goods within ten days ff their receipt by the
trustee may avoid that lien. In addition, under § 67(a)(3), 11
	 § 107(a)(3) (1976),
the trustee can "preserve" the lien for the benefit. of the estate, and use against other
creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding whatever rights the judicial lien creditor- had.
Thus, the trustee would prevail over a reclaiming cash seller to the extent that a judi-
cial lien would prevail over the seller.
It has been suggested, however- , that § 67(a) may apply only to liens on prop-
erty to which the trustee succeeds under § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976). Section
70(a) grants the trustee the title of the bankrupt as of the date of bankruptcy. See 4A
CoLLIER, supra note 132, 67.03, at 66.2 If so, and if the seller reclaims the goods
before bankruptcy, thus regaining full title, § 67(a) would not help a trustee.
"" A creditor with an Article 9 security interest in after-acquired property
would suffice, of course. As to the prevalence of such parties, see Dugan, supra note 2,
at 330 -34, As for the lien creditor, given the typically short. dine period between deliv-
ery and reclamation, the likelihood of an actual creditor levying or attaching is fairly
slight (assuming, of course, that such a lien creditor would have .rights superior to
those of the reclaiming seller).
1142 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Sum 2549 (1978).
"3
 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 546(c), 92 Star. 2597 (1978).
January 1979]	 THE CASH SELLER UNDER THE UCC	 407
debtor. 184
 The House ' "' and Senate's" subcommittee chairmen have stated that this
section "applies to receipt of goods on credit as well as by cash sales." The House'"
and Senate 188 Reports, however, state that this provision resolves the longstanding con-
flict between the trustee and the reclaiming credit seller proceeding under UCC section
2-702(2); 18"
 neither report mentions the cash seller. Nevertheless, to the extent that the
cash seller's reclamation right is tied to section 2-702,'"" section 546(c) is applicable to
the cash sale seller. However, if section 546(c) of the Reform Act applies to the cash
seller, this section sharply limits the seller's rights due to its ten-day written demand
requirement."' Because of section 546(c)s uncertain applicability to cash sales and
because failure to make the necessary written demand will probably force consideration
of the seller's rights under the provisions negated by section, 546(c) (not to mention those
it does not afPct), the Bankruptcy Reform Act analogs of section 70(c), 67(c), 60, and
70(e) will still be of concern to the cash seller.
The Reform Act's revisions of sections 70(c) 192 and 67(c) 13 also do not seem to
affect our discussion of . these sections in this article. Moreover, although the Reform Act
revised substantially section 60 of the existing Bankruptcy Act,' 14
 the revision basically
embodies the current section's definition of the key term "preference" 195 and, therefore,
does not affect our discussion of section 60. 1 " The only change in the Reform Act that
184 Fur the current "demand" requirements and the difficulties they pose, see
text and notes 58-73 supra.
1"
 124 Cove. REc. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 672 (Supp. !lc; Dec., 1978).
I" 124 CONG. REc. S17406 et seq. (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. De-
Concini), reprinted in [1978J U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 742 (Supp. 11c; Dec., 1978).
' 8 ' H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.. reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 544 (Supp. 11c; Dec., 1978).
I" S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 88-89 (Supp. 11c; Dec., 1978).
189 See notes 142-52 supra and accompanying text.
1 `30 See notes 51-73 supra and accompanying text.
"" For the problems posed for the cash seller by the current ten-day oral de-
mand requirement, see text and notes 65-66 supra.
192 See Pub. L. No. 95-598, ** 544(a)(1)(2), 92 Stat.. 2596 (1978). See also H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 87, 542-43 (Supp. I lc; Dec., 1978). For
this article's discussion of § 70(c), see text and notes 129-36 supra.
'"3 See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 545(2), 92 Stat. 2597 (1978). See also H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 87-88, 543 (Stipp. 11c; Dec., 1978). For this
article's discussion of section 67(c), see text and notes 137-54 supra. Here, as before,
the basic question is whether § 2-507(2) or § 2-511(3) is a "statutory lien." For the new
Act's definition of this term, see Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101(38), 92 Stat. 2554 (1978).
However, since § 546(c) clearly implies that the § 2-702(2) reclamation right is not to
be so regarded, it is doubtful the § 2-507(2) or § 2-511(3) rights are "statutory lines."
1114 See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547, 92 Stat. 2597-600 (1978).
11 ' Compare id t 547(b), 92 Stat. 2598 (1978) with the text. at note 158 supra.
196 Section 60 is discussed at text and notes 155-71 supra. The "reasonable
cause" discussion at text and notes 264 supra is substantially changed by the Reform
Act. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547(b)(4), 92 Stat. 2598 (1978). c Pub. L. No. 95-598,
** 101(9), 541(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2550-51, 2594 (1978) (slightly changed definitions of
"property of the debtor" and "creditor").
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is likely to affect our discussion in this article is the Act's revision of section 70(e). 197
The legislative history accompanying that section suggests that the trustee's ability to
deploy it against pre-bankruptcy transfers to reclaiming cash sellers now may be some-
what limited.'"
CONCLUSION
As we have demonstrated in this article, the rights of a cash seller under
the Uniform Commercial Code should not differ radically from those of the
cash seller under the common law. Section 2-507(2), the general cash sale
provision, and section 2-511(3), the "had check" provision, obviously stem
from pre-Code law and afford the cash seller the same right. to reclaim goods
for which the buyer has not paid that the cash seller enjoyed at common law.
As between the cash seller and third parties, however, the Code has made
some changes in the common law. Like the common law, section 2-403(1)
subordinates the unpaid cash seller's right to reclaim his goods to the rights of
the good faith purchaser for value who has purchased the goods from the
buyer. Like the common law, section 2-403(4) allows the unpaid cash seller to
prevail over the attaching lien creditor of the buyer—although a few courts
currently disagree with our conclusion. Unlike some common law cases, how-
ever, section 2-403(1) usually subordinates the cash seller to the holder of an
Article 9 security interest in the goods because a secured parry qualifies as a
good faith purchaser for value in most instances.
When the post-UCC cash seller confronts the buyer's trustee in bank-
ruptcy, the durability of the cash seller's right to reclaim is as yet unknown.
Whether the cash seller can resist a trustee's attack under section 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act (the "hypothetical lien creditor" provision) depends upon
whether courts adopt the correct view of the cash seller's priority over lien
creditors. Furthermore, whether the cash seller can repel an attack under sec-
tions 67(c) (the statutory lien provision) depends on the unresolved question
whether the cash seller's right to reclaim goods constitutes a statutory lien.
Finally, it remains unclear whether the cash seller's right to reclaim can be
defeated by section 60(1)) (the "voidable preference" provision) or section
70(e) (the existing, superior creditor provision).
" 7 See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 544(b). 92 Stat. 2596 (1978).
1 " See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1978) U.S. Coot: CONG. & An, News 87, 542 (Stipp, 11c; Dec.,
1978). The sources just cited state that: "Subsection (h) is derived from current section
70e. It gives the trustee the rights of actual unsecured creditors under applicable law
to void transfers. It follows Moore v. Bay . . . and overrules those cases that hold section
70e gives the trustee the rights of secured creditors." The refusal to allow the trustee
proceeding under section 70(e) to "sit in the shoes" of secured creditors significantly
limits his use of that section in the cash sale context, since theSsecured creditor is the
party most likely to be "actually existing" and capable of defeating the cash seller.
However, where the trustee can find a suitable existing party capable of defeating the
cash seller, the continued vitality- of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), means that he is
certain to displace all of the cash seller's claim. See text and notes 173-80 supra. See
generally Mann & Phillips, supra note 1, at 639-40.
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It. is our view that the Uniform Commercial Code generally preserves the
common law's protections. The UCC cash seller's rights, both in and out of
bankruptcy, are thus very similar to those of the common law cash seller.
Although courts in some recent decisions seem to have forgotten the protec-
tions which the cash seller deservedly enjoyed at common law, we are hopeful
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